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TRUST IN POLICE SLIDES, BUT 
COPS STILL TOPS IN CJS
Although Canadians’ trust in police has waned over 
the last several years, more people still trust the 
police than they do judges, lawyers, or law makers. 
In an Ipsos Reid poll released in January 2011 
entitled “A Matter of Trust”, the data reveals that 
police officers ratings in the trust survey is currently 
at 57% of Canadians. This is down 16 points from a 
rating  of 73% in 2003. The trust in lawyers slid 7 
points from 2003; they now sit at 22%. The trust in 
national politicians remained unchanged at 9% 
while judges had a trust rating  of 51%. So, as in 
years past, police continue to top the trust ratings for 
professions involved in the criminal justice system. 
Pharmacists were the most trusted profession at 79% 
followed by doctors (75%), airline pilots (75%), 
Canadian soldiers (72%), and teachers (65%). Car 
salespeople were the least trusted at 8% followed by 
national politicians (9%), union leaders (17%), local 
municipal politicians (17%), chief executive officers 
(19%), and new home builders (19%). 
In an earlier poll from December 2010, also 
conducted by Ipsos Reid for Postmedia News and 
Global National, similar results were noted. In this 
poll, police officers had a trust rating  of 55%, judges 
51%, Lawyers 31%, and national politicians 25%.
In an international survey conducted by the Gfk 
Group (“Gfk Trust Index 2010”), the police had a 
trust rating  of 75% among  the European countries 
participating. Germany and Italy had the highest 
trust in the police at 86% while Romania had the 
lowest at 54%. Judges sat at 62%, highest in 
Germany (83%) and lowest in Bulgaria (32%). 
Lawyers came in at 46%, highest in Germany (72%) 
and lowest in Bulgaria (31%). Finally, politicians 
ranked the lowest overall at 14%. The Netherlands 
trusted their politicians the most (32%) while Italy 
rated them at 7%. Overall, the fire service were most 
trusted at 94% followed by teachers and doctors 
(84%), postal workers (82%), and the military (81%).  
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WHAT’S NEW FOR POLICE IN 
THE LIBRARY
The Justice Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of its 
most recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
Academic writing: an introduction.
Janet Giltrow ... [et al.].
Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press, c2009.
PE 1408 G558 2009
Between two worlds:  the inner lives of children 
of divorce.
Elizabeth Marquardt.
New York, NY: Three Rivers Press, c2005.
HQ 777.5 M3746 2005
Canadian families: diversity, conflict and change.
[edited by] Nancy Mandell, Ann Duffy. 
Toronto, ON: Nelson Education, 2010.
HQ 560 C358 2010
The conduct of public inquiries:  law, policy, and 
practice.
Ed Ratushny.
Toronto, ON: Irwin Law, 2009.
KE 4765 R38 2009
The courage to heal: a guide for women survivors 
of child sexual abuse.
Ellen Bass & Laura Davis.
New York, NY: Harper, c2008.
HQ 72 U53 B37 2008
Creating a sense of presence in online teaching: 
how to "be there" for distance learners.
Rosemary M. Lehman, Simone C. O. Conceição.
San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2010.
"How can faculty create a strong  E presence for their 
online classes? This volume highlights the need for 
creating  a presence in the online environment. The 
authors explore the emotional, psychological, and 
social aspects from both the instructor and student 
perspective. It provides an instructional design 
framework and shows how a strong  presence 
contributes to effective teaching  and learning. Filled 
with illustrative examples and based on research and 
experience, the book contains methods, case  
scenarios, and activities for creating, maintaining, 
and evaluating  presence throughout the cycle of an 
online course."- LB 1044.87 L439 2010
A designer's log: case studies in instructional 
design.
Michael Power.
Edmonton, AB: AU Press, c2009.
LB 2361 P682 2009
Evidence-based training methods: a guide for 
training professionals.
Ruth Colvin Clark.
Alexandria, VA: ASTD Press, c2010.
HD 8038 A1 C53 2010
The executive and the elephant: a leader's guide 
for building inner excellence.
Richard L. Daft. 
San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, c2010.
BF 637 L4 D34 2010
The experiential learning  toolkit:  blending 
practice with concepts.
Colin Beard.
London, UK; Philadelphia, PA: Kogan Page, 2010.
BF 318.5 B427 2010
Facilitating  group learning:  strategies for success 
with diverse adult learners.
George Lakey.
San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, c2010.
LC 5225 L42 L35 2010
Feeding your leadership pipeline: how to develop 
the next generation of leaders in small  to mid-
sized companies.
Daniel R. Tobin.  
Alexandria, VA: ASTD Press; San Francisco: Berrett-
Koehler, 2010.
HD 30.4 T635 2010
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Full-body flexibility.
Jay Blahnik.
Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics, c2011.
RA 781.63 B56 2011
Graphics for learning: proven guidelines for 
planning, designing, and evaluating visuals in 
training material.
Ruth Colvin Clark, Chopeta Lyons.
San Francisco, CA: John Wiley, 2011.
LB 1043.5 C53 2011
A guide to copyrights.
Gatineau, QC: Canadian Intellectual Property 
Office, [2008].
KE 2799.2 G85 2008
Handbook of practical program evaluation.
Joseph S. Wholey, Harry P. Hatry, Kathryn E. 
Newcomer, editors.
San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, c2010.
H 97 H358 2010
How learning  works:  seven research-based 
principles for smart teaching.
Susan A. Ambrose ... [et al.]; foreword by Richard E. 
Mayer.
San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, c2010.
LB 1025.3 H68 2010
How to study in college.
Walter Pauk, Ross J. Q. Owens.
Boston, MA: Cengage Learning, [2010], c2011.
LB 2395 P385 2010
Information literacy programs in  the digital  age: 
educating college and university students online.
compiled by Alice Daugherty and Michael F. Russo.
Chicago, IL: Association of College and Research 
Libraries, 2007.
ZA 3075 I538 2007
Interviewing  as qualitative research:  a guide for 
researchers in education and the social sciences.
Irving Seidman.
New York, NY: Teachers College Press, c2006.
H 61.28 S45 2006
The invisible gorilla:  and other ways our 
intuitions deceive us.
Christopher F. Chabris and Daniel J. Simons.
New York, NY: Crown, 2010.
BF 321 C43 2010
Leaders make the future:  ten new leadership 
skills for an uncertain world.
Bob Johansen.
San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 
c2009.
HD 57.7 J635 2009
Leadership matters.
Rick Hillier.
Toronto, ON: Harper Collins Canada, 2010.
HD 57.7 H545 2010
Liespotting:  proven techniques to detect 
deception.
Pamela Meyer.
New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 2010.
BF 637 D42 M49 2010
Looking at law: Canada's legal system.
Patrick Fitzgerald, Barry Wright, Vincent Kazmierski.
Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2010.
KE 444 F588 2010
Love is letting go of fear.
Gerald G. Jampolsky ; foreword by Carlos Santana; 
illustrated by Jack Keeler.
Berkeley, CA: Celestial Arts, c2010.
BF 575 L8 J33 2010
The minute taker's handbook.
Jane Watson.
Toronto, ON: CSAE=SCDA, c2009.
HF 5734.5 W38 2009
More time for you: a powerful  system to organize 
your work and get things done.
Rosemary Tator and Alesia Latson.
New York, NY: American Management Association, 
c2011.
HD 69 T54 T38 2011
Volume 11 Issue 2 - March/April 2011
PAGE 5
Networking  for people who hate networking: a 
field guide for introverts, the overwhelmed, and 
the underconnected.
Devora Zack.
San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 
c2010.
HD 69 S8 Z34 2010
The new social learning: a guide to transforming 
organizations through social media.
Tony Bingham and Marcia Conner; foreword by 
Daniel H. Pink.
Alexandria, VA: ASTD Press; San Francisco : Berrett-
Koehler Publishers, c2010.
HQ 784 M3 B56 2010
Parenting apart:  how separated and divorced 
parents can raise happy and secure kids.
Christina McGhee.
New York, NY: Berkley Books, 2010.
HQ 759.915 M394 2010
Power speak:  engage, inspire, and stimulate your 
audience.
Dorothy Leeds. 
Franklin Lakes, NJ: Career Press, c2003.
PN 4121 L44 2003
Program evaluation: alternative approaches and 
practical guidelines.
Jody L. Fitzpatrick, James R. Sanders, Blaine R. 
Worthen.
Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education, c2011.
LB 2822.75 W67 2011
Putting  children first: proven parenting  strategies 
for helping children thrive through divorce.
JoAnne Pedro-Carroll.
New York, NY: Avery, 2010.
HQ 777.5 P43 2010
The relaxation response.
by Herbert Benson ; with Miriam Z. Klipper.
New York, NY: Avon Books, [2000].
RA 785 B48 2000
R e s p o n d i n g  t o c r i s e s i n t h e m o d e r n 
infrastructure: policy lessons from Y2K
Kevin F. Quigley.
New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
HD 61 Q54 2008
Successful onboarding: a strategy to unlock 
hidden value within your organization.
Mark A. Stein and Lilith Christiansen. 
New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, c2010.
HF 5549.5 I53 S737 2010
The systematic design of instruction.
Walter Dick, Lou Carey, James O. Carey. 
Upper Saddle River, NJ: Merrill/Pearson, c2009.
LB 1028.38 D53 2009
The tolerability of risk: a new framework for risk 
management.
edited by Frédéric Bouder, David Slavin and Ragnar 
E. Löfstedt.
London, UK; Sterling, VA: Earthscan, 2009.
HD 61 T65 2009
Violence against women in  Canada: research  and 
policy perspectives.
Holly Johnson & Myrna Dawson.
Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press Canada, 
2011.
HV 6250.4 W65 J64 2011
Visual meetings:  how graphics, sticky notes, & 
idea mapping can transform group productivity.
David Sibbet.
Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, c2010.
HD 66 S564 2010
Wellbeing: the five essential elements.
Tom Rath, Jim Harter.
New York, NY: Gallup Press, c2010.
BF 637 S8 R37 2010
Women in public administration:  theory and 
practice.
edited by Maria J. D'Agostino, Helisse Levine. 
Sudbury, MA: Jones & Bartlett Learning, c2011.
HQ 1390 D34 2011
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Note-able Quote
“Leadership  and learning are indispensable to each 
other.” - John F. Kennedy
GOOD FAITH BELIEF MUST BE 
REASONABLY HELD
R. v. Caron, 2011 BCCA 56
 
A highway patrol officer “clocked” a 
vehicle on radar traveling  at 165 km/
h in a 100 km/h zone. He activated 
his emergency lights and siren and 
pursued the vehicle. At one point the 
vehicle slowed to 120 km/h and crossed over a 
double-yellow centre line and into the on-coming 
lane to pass a truck. The officer followed the vehicle 
for approximately two kilometers before it pulled 
over. The accused, who was the driver and sole 
occupant of the vehicle, was arrested for dangerous 
driving. He was advised of his rights, handcuffed, 
and placed in the rear of the police vehicle. The 
officer went back to the accused’s vehicle to look for 
its registration and opened the glove compartment, 
but did not find the documents. Instead, he found a 
digital camera. He turned it on and scrolled through 
the photographs in its memory thinking  that there 
might be photographs of the accused’s speedometer 
showing  a high rate of speed. This belief was based 
on his previous experience encountering  people 
taking  pictures of themselves engaged in criminal 
activity. However, he had not seen the accused 
holding  a camera or reaching  for the glove 
compartment, and felt the accused was so focused 
on his driving  that he did not notice the police car 
behind him. After scrolling  through some “family 
photos” on the camera, the officer came across 
several photographs of the accused and others with 
firearms. After seeing  the photographs the officer’s 
concern for his own safety heightened because it 
appeared the accused had access to firearms. He 
was also concerned about the possibility of firearms 
being  left inside the vehicle when it was towed to 
the local towing  company’s lot. He searched the 
vehicle and found a cardboard box containing 
$60,000 (30 bundles x $2,000) inside the hatch-
back. He also found a backpack containing  a loaded 
9 mm semi-automatic pistol.
At trial in British Columbia Supreme Court the 
accused was convicted of unauthorized possession 
of a restricted weapon in a motor vehicle (the 
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
General Deterrence
“Section 718 of the Criminal Code 
provides that general deterrence is 
one of the objectives of sentencing. 
This Court has confirmed that general 
deterrence is of primary importance in drug 
trafficking cases.
The Criminal Code provides that deterrence is an 
objective in sentencing (s. 718(b)). It is not open to a 
sentencing judge to bypass that provision, and conclude 
that general deterrence is irrelevant or ineffective. The 
Crown does not have to prove that actual general 
deterrence will in fact result from any particular 
sentence in a particular case. It is also an error of 
principle for a trial court to discount the deterrent 
effect of any particular kind of punishment provided 
for in the Code, such as imprisonment, because he or 
she believes that imprisonment has not been proven 
effective. The deprivation of liberty by imprisonment is 
the most severe form of punishment available in 
Canada today; harsher penalties of previous times have 
been abolished. It is an error to eliminate 
imprisonment as a possible sentence because of the 
sentencing judge’s subjective doubts about its general 
efficacy”.– Alberta Court of Appeal in R. v. Tran, 2010 
ABCA 317 at para. 8, 12 in sentencing an accused afresh 
from the starting point of three (3) years for possessing 
cocaine for the purpose of trafficking. 
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loaded pistol) and possession of 
property obtained by crime (the 
money). The judge found that, even if 
the officer had a subjective basis as 
to why he examined the contents of 
the digital camera for confirmatory 
evidence of driving  at high speeds, 
his belief was not objectively 
reasonable. “It seems to me that this 
comes very close to the line and I am 
concerned that absent evidence of 
wide practice that persons actually 
photograph their speedometer while 
they are speeding, I think that it 
would be dangerous to permit that 
type of search to continue,” said the 
judge. “It is close to the line of what 
might be legitimate versus indiscriminate fishing  for 
evidence.” Nonetheless, the trial judge admitted the 
gun and money as evidence under s. 24(2) of the 
Charter. The evidence was non-conscriptive and 
would not undermine trial fairness. As well, the 
judge found the officer acted in good faith with an 
honest subjective belief that the camera may have 
contained photographs of the vehicle’s speedometer, 
which, among  other things, mitigated the seriousness 
of the Charter breach. The offences were very 
serious, the gun and cash were crucial to the 
Crown’s case, and the exclusion of the evidence 
would bring  the administration of justice into 
disrepute.
 
The accused appealed to the British Columbia Court 
of Appeal arguing  the trial judge erred in admitting 
the evidence. The Crown, on the other hand, 
suggested the trial judge did not make a mistake in 
his admissibility ruling.
 
Good Faith & the Search
 
Even though there was no objectively reasonable 
prospect that evidence of dangerous driving  would 
be located in the camera, the trial judge ruled that 
the officer was acting  in good faith. In his view, the 
officer sincerely believed that the inspection of the 
camera might disclose evidence regarding  the 
speedometer speed of the vehicle. However, 
contrary to the trial judge’s finding, Justice Frankel of 
Court of the Appeal held the officer 
was not acting  in good faith. “‘Good 
faith’ and its polar opposite, ‘bad 
faith’ (or ‘flagrant’ disregard), are 
terms of art in the s. 24(2) lexicon,” 
he said. “The absence of bad faith 
does not equate to good faith, nor 
does the absence of good faith 
equate to bad faith. To fall at either 
end of this spectrum requires a 
particular mental state.”  Since good 
faith connotes an honest and 
reasonably held belief, if the officer’s 
belief is not reasonable they will not 
be acting in good faith.
 
Here, the search was warrantless. It 
was purportedly done under the 
common-law power to search a vehicle incidental to 
arrest. The Crown bore the burden of proving  it was 
reasonable. Although the officer believed the camera 
might contain photographs of the car’s speedometer, 
there was no evidence the officer also believed he 
was entitled to examine the camera pursuant to the 
power of search incidental to arrest. Without a 
finding  that the officer believed he was engaged in a 
lawful search, he cannot be said to have acted in 
good faith. And even if he had testified that he 
believed he was lawfully entitled to examine the 
camera for evidence of dangerous driving, such a 
belief would not have been objectively reasonable. 
Although the reasonable grounds standard does not 
apply to searches incident to arrest, there is still a 
“reasonable basis” requirement. The officer did not 
elaborate on the circumstances of previously seeing 
photographs of speedometers at high rates of speed. 
He never saw the accused holding  a camera or 
reaching  for the glove compartment. It was only 
speculation that the accused used the camera to take 
a photograph of his speedometer and then placed 
the camera in the glove compartment. The officer 
never turned his mind to whether there was a 
reasonable prospect such evidence would be found 
in the circumstances in which the camera was 
discovered. The officer “either knew, or ought to 
have known, that before conducting  a search 
incidental to arrest he was required to consider 
whether, on the specific facts of his investigation, 
“[The officer] either 
knew, or ought to have 
known, that before 
conducting a search 
incidental to arrest he 
was required to consider 
whether, on the specific 
facts of his investigation, 
there was a reasonable 
prospect that what he 
wished to search for 
would be found.”  
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there was a reasonable 
prospect that what he 
wished to search for would 
be found,” Justice Frankel 
s a id i n t he s . 24 (2 ) 
a n a l y s i s . “ Th e l e g a l 
framework for searches 
incidental to arrest was 
establ ished ten years 
before this case arose. It is 
[the officer’s] failure to 
consider whether the 
examination of the camera 
fell within the parameters 
set by the Supreme Court 
of Canada that makes the breach here more serious 
than one which is the result of mere inadvertence or 
an error in judgment.” Thus, the trial judge erred in 
considering  good faith as a mitigating  factor in his s. 
24(2) analysis. The accused’s appeal was allowed, 
the evidence was excluded, the convictions were set 
aside, and acquittals were entered.
 
Safety Concerns
 
Had the examination of the camera been lawful, the 
Court of Appeal opined that the photographs the 
officer saw would have justified a search for firearms 
on the basis of safety concerns even though the 
accused was handcuffed and seated in the back of a 
police vehicle. In the photographs the accused was 
using  a pistol in what appeared to be an unlawful 
manner. Although the officer did not know when or 
where the photographs were taken, his concern that 
the accused had access to firearms was legitimate 
and provided a reasonable basis for searching  the 
vehicle:      
 
That [the accused] was restrained before his 
vehicle was searched did not have the effect of 
negating  the concerns that [the officer] had for 
his own safety. By definition, a search incidental 
to arrest takes place after someone is taken into 
custody and has had his or her immediate ability 
to harm others substantially diminished. 
However, the opportunity for harm is not 
completely eliminated as there is always a 
possibility that the arrestee will break free and 
seek to use a weapon in the immediate vicinity. 
A search intended to lessen that 
possibility falls within the valid 
objectives of the criminal 
justice system.
 
As well, it was legitimate for 
[the officer] to be concerned 
about a vehicle that might 
contain firearms being  towed to 
a relatively insecure storage 
facility. If there were firearms is 
the vehicle, and if those 
firearms fell into the wrong 
hands, then the public would 
be at risk. [paras. 49-50]
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
CELL PHONE SEARCH FOR 
OWNERSHIP OK
R. v. Manley, 2011 ONCA 128
Following  robberies of a Mr. Sub 
restaurant and a music store, police 
received confidential information 
identifying  the accused as a suspect 
in the music store robbery. A CPIC 
check revealed there was an outstanding  warrant for 
him on a break and enter. They also had information 
he had stolen cell phones and used them with stolen 
access cards. The accused was arrested for the music 
store robbery and the outstanding  arrest warrant for 
break and enter offence. He was frisked incidental to 
the arrest. Police found a concealed knife and a cell 
phone, as well as two GM car keys (one modified to 
break into cars), a hypodermic needle, handcuffs 
and a handcuff key, binoculars, and local garbage 
bag  tags.  The police examined the cell phone to 
identify its lawful owner. There was nothing  on the 
exterior of the phone to identify its owner so it was 
opened. The officer pushed various scroll and other 
buttons in order to observe the saved data in the 
phone and, in the process, found a photograph of 
the accused holding  a sawed off shotgun, which was 
taken the day after the music store robbery.  The 
phone was losing  power so, in order to preserve the 
image, it was downloaded and copied. A warrant 
was subsequently obtained to search the contents of 
the phone. 
“[A] search incidental to arrest takes 
place after someone is taken into 
custody and has had his or her 
immediate ability to harm others 
substantially diminished. However, 
the opportunity for harm is not 
completely eliminated as there is 
always a possibility that the arrestee 
will break free and seek to use a 
weapon in the immediate vicinity.”  
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At trial the accused did not 
challenge the lawfulness of his arrest 
but argued the photo should be 
excluded as evidence because it was 
unlawful for the police to examine 
the phone’s contents without a 
warrant. The subsequent warrant the 
police did obtain, it was argued, was 
tainted by the earlier warrantless 
search.  The Ontario Superior Court 
of Justice, however, ruled that the 
search was reasonable. The judge 
found that the search and seizure 
conducted at the time of arrest was 
carried out for three reasons: (1)  for 
the safety of the police and the 
public since the accused was 
suspected of committing  crimes with weapons; (2) to 
check the ownership of items in the accused’s 
possession; and (3)  to check for evidence and to 
protect it from destruction. The search warrant was 
valid and, even if there was a Charter breach, the 
photo would have been admissible under s. 24(2). 
The accused was convicted by a jury of several 
offences related to the two retail robberies and 
sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment. 
The accused challenged the trial judge’s ruling  to the 
Ontario Court of Appeal arguing, in part, that the 
trial judge erred in holding  that the police were 
entitled to search the saved data in the phone 
without a warrant as an incident to arrest. In his 
view, the only thing  taken in the robbery had been 
cash and there was no reasonable prospect that 
searching  the cell phone would provide evidence of 
the robbery. Further, he contended that even if the 
police had grounds to believe that the cell phone 
had been stolen, they had no power to search the 
saved data in the cell phone without a warrant. The 
Crown, on the other hand, suggested that the 
accused was also arrested for a break and enter and 
the police had information that he had used stolen 
cell phones in the past; therefore the police were 
entitled to conduct a cursory warrantless inspection 
of the cell phone, including  its stored data, to 
ascertain ownership of the phone and determine 
whether it was stolen. This was a valid purpose 
connected to the arrest.  If the phone was not the 
accused’s, it could serve as 
evidence of a break and enter 
and the rightful owner could be 
informed that the phone had 
been recovered. In addition, the 
Crown submitted that the police 
were ent i t led to conduct 
warrantless searches of cell 
phones seized as an incident to 
a lawful arrest.
Justice Sharpe, authoring  the 
opinion of the Court of Appeal, 
agreed, at least in part, with the 
Crown. He first summed the 
power of search incident to 
arrest in this way:
It is common ground that incident to a lawful 
arrest, the police have the power to search the 
person arrested without a warrant for the 
purpose of ensuring  officer safety, and, if there is 
“some reasonable prospect of securing evidence 
of the offence for which the accused is being 
arrested”, to secure and preserve that evidence. 
[para. 33]
He then accepted the Crown’s first but narrow 
submission that the police were entitled to search 
the phone to establish its ownership:
The [accused] was arrested for break and enter 
and, when arrested, he was in possession of a 
number of unusual and suspicious items. The 
police had information from a confidential 
informant that in the past the [accused] had 
stolen cell phones. Ownership of the cell phone 
was relevant to the offences for which the 
[accused] had been arrested. In my view, this 
combination of circumstances provided the 
police with a lawful basis for conducting a 
cursory search of the cell phone to determine 
whether it had been stolen. As I can see no basis 
to interfere with trial judge’s factual finding  that 
the first officer came upon the photograph while 
conducting a search of the cell phone to 
determine its ownership, I would uphold the trial 
judge’s determination that the cursory search of 
the cell phone was lawful.  
“[I]ncident to a lawful arrest, 
the police have the power to 
search the person arrested 
without a warrant for the 
purpose of ensuring officer 
safety, and, if there is “some 
reasonable prospect of 
securing evidence of the 
offence for which the accused 
is being arrested”, to secure 
and preserve that evidence.”  
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I wish to emphasize, however that my decision 
rests on two points. First, that the police had a 
legitimate interest in determining  whether the 
cell phone had been stolen and second, that the 
police did not search the stored data in the cell 
phone for any other purpose. According to the 
testimony on the voir dire that was accepted by 
the trial judge, the cell phone’s telephone 
number was identified after the discovery of the 
photograph.  A telephone number is sufficient 
information from which the ownership of a 
phone may be determined. Had the examination 
of the phone continued after the telephone 
number had been found, this would be a 
different case. If the telephone number had been 
written or inscribed on the exterior of the cell 
phone or visible or easily found when the phone 
was opened, any further search obviously could 
not be justified as a cursory inspection to 
determine ownership. Likewise, in a case where 
there was no reason to doubt the arrested party’s 
ownership of the phone and no link between 
ownership and the offence for which the person 
was arrested, a search of the stored data in the 
phone could not be justified on the basis that the 
police were simply trying to determine who 
owned the phone. [paras. 37-38]
As for the Crown’s more general proposition, that the 
police could just search a cell phone incident to 
arrest, Justice Sharpe found it “neither necessary nor 
desirable to attempt to provide a comprehensive 
definition of the powers of the police to search the 
stored data in cell phones seized upon arrest.” 
However, he did make the following caution:
... I would observe it is apparent that the 
traditional rules defining the powers of the 
police to conduct a search incident to arrest 
have to be interpreted and applied in a manner 
that takes into account the facts of modern 
technology. ... Cell phones and other similar 
handheld communication devices in common 
use have the capacity to store vast amounts of 
highly sensi t ive personal , pr ivate and 
confidential information – all manner of private 
voice, text and e-mail communications, detailed 
personal contact lists, agendas, diaries and 
personal photographs. An open-ended power to 
search without a warrant all the stored data in 
any cell phone found in the possession of any 
arrested person clearly raises the spectre of a 
serious and significant invasion of the Charter-
protected privacy interests of arrested persons. If 
the police have reasonable grounds to believe 
that the search of a cell phone seized upon 
arrest would yield evidence of the offence, the 
prudent course is for them to obtain a warrant 
authorizing the search.
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
ONLY A CONNECTION OR LINK 
BETWEEN OFFENCE AND 
CRIMINAL ORGANIZATION 
REQUIRED 
R. v. Drecic, 2011 ONCA 118
The accused was charged with 
trafficking  in cocaine in association 
with a criminal organization, 
trafficking  in GHB, and trafficking  in 
cocaine. He was a full patch 
member of the Hells Angels. He pled guilty in the 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice except to the 
criminal organization charge. During  his trial he was 
convicted. The trial judge found that the drugs were 
purchased by another member of the Hells Angels, 
who was acting  as a police agent, and were for 
further distribution and trafficking  for profit. He also 
found that the accused was the middle man, 
facilitating  the agent in obtaining  these drugs from a 
reliable source. Although the drug  supplier was not 
himself a member of the Hells Angels, the accused 
introduced him to the police agent. The accused was 
able to  use his position as a Hells Angels member to 
warrant the reliability of the drug  supplier and the 
police agent to each other. The trial judge held that 
the accused’s membership in the Hells Angels was 
the catalyst that brought the parties together and it 
played an integral role in the ensuing  drug 
transactions. “Rules of the club ensure that when 
members deal with each other or third parties there 
will be no rip offs,” said the judge. “All of these 
benefits were at play in the various drug  transactions 
conducted by [the accused]”.
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The accused then appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal arguing  the criminal organization had to be 
“directly involved” in the underlying  offence or play 
a “direct and integral role in it”. But the Court of 
Appeal disagreed. “[T]he “in association with” 
requirement of s. 476.12(1) of the Code will be 
made out so long  as there is a connection or link 
between the underlying  offence and the criminal 
organization,” said the Court of Appeal. “In our 
view, the findings upon which the trial judge 
concluded that the requisite link had been made out 
were reasonable inferences available to him on the 
evidence. ... Finally, no issue can be taken with the 
trial judge’s finding  that the Hells Angels Motorcycle 
Club is a criminal organization. The evidence in that 
regard is overwhelming.” The accused’s appeal was 
dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
CHARTER BREACH MINOR:
EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE 
R. v. MacDuff, 2011 BCCA 2
 
Two employees of an energy 
company conducted a service check 
at a residence and discovered that 
electricity was being  stolen by the 
occupant. The test lasted 6.2 seconds 
and disclosed that 19,225 watts of electricity was 
stolen during  that brief time.  They filed a police 
report outlining  the amount of wattage they believed 
was being  stolen. A police officer applied for a 
telewarrant to search the premises on the basis of the 
theft report from the energy company as well as 
other investigations he conducted.  The Information 
to Obtain stated that the telewarrant was being 
applied for “because it is impracticable for the 
Informant to appear personally because: ‘There are 
no JJPs available at the local courthouse today, or 
any time this week.’” The police executed the search 
warrant at the accused’s residence and found a 
sophisticated, multiple room grow operation in the 
basement. There were 1,619 marihuana plants in 
two stages of production, valued between $94,000 - 
$141,000 per crop.  The police also found a hydro 
bypass used to steal electricity.
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court the 
officer amplified the evidence regarding  the 
impracticability of appearing  in person. He said he 
called the courthouse prior to starting  the paperwork 
for the warrant to see if there was a Judicial Justice of 
the Peace (JJP) available. He was told that there were 
none available that day nor would there be any 
available for the rest of the week.  However, the 
officer made no inquiries about the availability of a 
judge to hear the warrant. The trial judge quashed 
the telewarrant because s. 487.1(4) requires that the 
officer include a statement of the circumstances that 
make it impracticable for him to appear personally 
before a justice, which the officer failed to do. 
However, the trial judge admitted the evidence 
pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Charter. The accused was 
convicted of producing  marihuana, possessing 
marihuana for the purpose of trafficking, and theft of 
electricity. 
The accused appealed to the British Columbia Court 
of Appeal submitting  the trial judge erred in 
admitting  the evidence under s. 24(2).  The Crown, 
on the other hand, suggested the trial judge did not 
err.
Justice Bennett, speaking  for the Court of Appeal, 
upheld the admissibility of the evidence. Although 
the impact of the breach on the Charter-protected 
privacy interests of the accused was serious - the 
police searched his home - the Charter violation was 
relatively minor. “The police officer obtained a 
warrant from a member of the judiciary,” said Justice 
Bennett. “He provided the JJP with all of the 
information he had obtained. He ensured that there 
was no JJP  who could hear his application in person 
within a reasonable time frame. His only error was 
to fail to confirm that a judge was unavailable to 
hear the application, based on his (correct) 
understanding  that judges were not to be asked to 
issue daytime warrants.  The trial judge found no bad 
faith on the part of the officer. This conduct is at the 
minor end of the Charter breach spectrum.” As well, 
the evidence seized was highly reliable and key to 
the prosecution, without it there was no case. These 
factors weighed in favour of the inclusion of 
evidence and the accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
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UTTERANCES MORE THAN 
SMALL SNIPPETS OF A 
CONVERSATION
R. v. Yates, 2011 ABCA 43 
The accused was arrested three days 
after a man was killed from a gunshot 
wound to the back of his head. The 
deceased’s trailer was then set on fire. 
The accused was taken to the police 
detachment where he exercised his right to speak to 
counsel. The next day he admitted to the 
investigating  officers that he shot the victim and set 
fire to the residence. He also admitted his guilt when 
being  fingerprinted and processed and was 
overheard making  inculpatory statements while 
talking  to another prisoner at the detachment. About 
a month later, while being  transported with two 
other prisoners in a sheriff’s van from the 
correctional center to the courthouse, a sheriff 
overheard comments made by the accused to the 
other prisoners. The sheriff was not paying  special 
attention to the beginning  of the conversation 
between the prisoners until he realized the accused 
was talking  about the crime. The sheriff overheard 
the accused and recorded the following  statements 
in his notebook within an hour after they were 
made: 
✴ “He was skidding  on my sister, so I shot him 
in the fucking head.” 
✴ “It was the only honourable thing to do.” 
✴ “I got my rifle, I got an AK-47A, and I hid it 
the night before.” 
✴ “I went over there the next day, when I was 
sober, and talked to him.” 
✴ “I asked him why he had to be such a fucking 
goof.” 
The Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench trial judge 
concluded that these utterances could be admitted 
into evidence as they were voluntary. The accused 
was found guilty by a jury of first degree murder. 
However, he appealed his conviction arguing, 
among  other grounds, that the trial judge erred in 
admitting  the utterances overheard in the prisoner's 
van as recorded by the sheriff because they were 
fragmented, not recorded verbatim, and incomplete 
in terms of context.  
The Alberta Court of Appeal dismissed the accused’s 
appeal. The statements made by the accused were 
more than partial thoughts. Although the sheriff did 
not hear the entire conversation in the prisoner van, 
he paid special attention once he determined the 
accused was speaking  about his crime. The 
comments recorded were longer and more 
numerous than just a small snippet of a statement. 
There was context to the utterances from which the 
true meaning  of the accused’s words could be 
inferred. 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
SUPREME COURT TAKES 
LONGER TO DECIDE CASES
In the “Bulletin of Proceedings: Special Edition, 
Statistics 2000 to 2010” the workload of the 
Supreme Court of Canada was reported. In 2010 the 
Supreme Court heard 65 appeals, down from 72 in 
2009. This was the second lowest number of appeals 
heard by Canada’s top court in a single year during 
the last decade (58 appeals were heard in 2007).
Case Life Span
The time it takes for the Court to render a judgment 
from the date of hearing  the case is at an eleven year 
high. In 2010 it took 7.7 months for the Court to 
announce its decision after hearing  arguments, up 
from 7.4 months in 2009. Overall it takes 18.8 
months, on average, for the court to render an 
opinion from the time an application for leave to 
hear a case is filed. This too is up from the previous 
year (18.2 months). 
Applications for Leave
Ontario was the source of most applications for 
leave to appeal at 139 cases. This was followed by 
Quebec (117), British Columbia (66), the Federal 
Court of Appeal (61), Alberta (29), Nova Scotia (13), 
New Brunswick (11), Newfoundland (9), Manitoba 
(8), Saskatchewan (5), Prince Edward Island (4), 
Nunavut (2), and Northwest Territories (1). No 
applications for leave came from the Yukon.
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Appeals Heard
Of the 65 appeals heard in 2010, the Federal Court 
of Appeal was the origin of the most appeals of any 
source at 18, followed by British Columbia (13), 
Onta r io (10 ) , A lber ta (10 ) , Quebec (9 ) , 
Saskatchewan (3), and Manitoba (2). No appeals 
originated from New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, 
Northwest Territories, Prince Edward Island, Yukon, 
Newfoundland, or Nunavut. 
Of the appeals heard in 2010, 
66% were civil while the 
r e m a i n i n g  3 4 % w e r e 
criminal. Eleven percent 
(11%) of the criminal cases 
dealt with Charter issues, 
down from 15% in 2009. 
Fifteen (15) of the appeals 
heard in 2010 were as of 
right. This source of appeal 
includes cases where there is 
a dissent on a point of law in 
a provincial court of appeal. 
The remaining  50 cases had 
leave to appeal granted. This 
is where a three judge panel 
gives permission to the applicant for the appeal to be 
heard. 
Appeal Judgments
There were 69 appeal judgments released in 2010, 
down from 70 in 2009. Only four decisions last year 
were delivered from the bench while the remaining 
65 were delivered after being 
reserved. Twenty nine (29) of 
the appeals were allowed 
while 40 were dismissed. The 
court was more unanimous 
than the previous year. In 
2010, 75% of the Court’s 
decisions were unanimous. 
The remaining  25% were 
split.  
Source: www.scc-csc.gc.ca
ONTARIO COURT OF APPEAL FAST FACTS: 
2010
• court made up of 22 full-time judges and two 
supernumerary judges.
• appeals were 38% civil, 32% criminal, 23% 
inmate, 7% family.
• of all appeals 280 were allowed, 722 were 
dismissed, and 315 were disposed of otherwise. 
Disposed of otherwise includes appeals in which 
the parties have settled their matter or matters have 
been dismissed on consent prior to the hearing.
Source: Court of Appeal For Ontario, Annual Report 2010
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POLICE BELIEVED THEY HAD  
GROUNDS FOR ARREST: 
EVIDENCE ADMITTED
R. v. Deenah, 2010 ONCA 775    
A police officer was patrolling  a high 
crime area to check the sobriety of 
drivers leaving  bars. An officer saw a 
vehicle leave a restaurant at about 
2:53 am. Police bulletins indicated 
there had been drugs, drug  trafficking, and guns 
around this restaurant. He followed the vehicle with 
the intention of pulling  it over and checking  the 
driver’s sobriety. The vehicle 
turned right at an intersection 
without coming  to a full stop 
at a red light. Police pulled 
the vehicle over and the 
accused appeared to be 
leaning  away as if to mask 
the odour of alcohol on his 
breath. The officer smelled 
alcohol in the vehicle but the 
accused said he had not 
been drinking. A passenger, 
leaning  forward, said he had 
been dr inking, not the 
accused. The officer was a little suspicious of the 
passenger’s behaviour because he would answer the 
questions put to the accused. While scanning  the 
inside of the vehicle with his flashlight the officer 
saw two small, white rock substances that were 
“possibly crack cocaine” on the floor mat. The 
officer asked the accused to step from the vehicle 
and come to the police car so he could determine 
where the smell of alcohol was coming  from. The 
accused was arrested for possessing  a controlled 
substance, patted down, and found to be wearing  a 
bullet proof vest. The passenger was also arrested for 
possessing  a controlled substance and the vehicle 
was searched. Police located a loaded revolver, a 
loaded semi-automatic handgun, 23 grams of crack 
cocaine, 5.3 grams of powdered cocaine, digital 
scales and $345. At cells the accused was also 
issued a ticket for running  the red light. The analysis 
of the two small white pieces from the floor mat 
revealed they did not contain crack cocaine. 
An Ontario Superior Court justice rejected the 
accused's argument that he had been arbitrarily 
detained. The accused submitted that the sobriety 
check and Highway Traffic Act (HTA) infringement 
were after-the-fact rationalizations to justify a 
racially motivated stop to investigate possible 
criminal activity. But the judge disagreed. She found 
that the police were entitled to stop the car observed 
leaving  a bar late at night to determine if evidence 
existed to make a breath demand under the Criminal 
Code. Furthermore, the accused drove through a red 
light without stopping, an HTA infraction. The officer 
did nothing  wrong  in asking  the accused to come 
back to the police car to determine whether there 
were grounds for a roadside test. The 
officer smelled alcohol and was trying 
to determine the source of the odour. 
The judge concluded that the initial 
stop and questioning  regarding  sobriety 
and the HTA infraction, as well as 
asking  him to exit the vehicle, 
amounted to a lawful detention and did 
not breach s. 9 of the Charter. 
The search, however, was a different 
matter. A search incidental to arrest 
requires a lawful arrest. Here, the 
accused argued the arrest was illegal 
because the police did not have reasonable grounds 
to make it. In determining  whether reasonable 
grounds exists, the arresting  officer must subjectively 
have reasonable grounds and the grounds must also 
be justifiable from an objective point of view. But in 
this case the judge was not persuaded that there was 
a reasonable subjective or objective basis for 
arresting  the accused or the passenger for possessing 
a controlled substance. The judge stated:
As has often been written, traffic stops can be 
abused by the police for improper purposes. The 
police are generally aware that they cannot 
search a car without lawful authority, and a 
search often flows from the arrest of the driver of 
the motor vehicle for a criminal offence.
The power to arrest in the circumstances of 
traffic stops can be misused by the police in 
order to carry out the search of a motor vehicle 
that the police have no lawful right to search. 
The Courts must be vigilant as to the basis of the 
“There is a difference 
between unfairly second-
guessing the police officers, 
and subjecting the basis for 
the arrest of members of the 
public to a reasonable legal 
standard, which the police 
should always try to meet.”  
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police officer's grounds for arrest. On the other 
hand, I agree with those Courts that have stated 
that trial judges cannot in essence, "arm chair 
quarterback" the police officers who have to 
make quick decisions based on the information 
they have in often urgent situations. [paras. 
78-79]
And further:
Certainly, taking  all of the factors together, 
including  the size and description, or lack 
thereof, of the two white pieces, I am not 
satisfied the officers had either the subjective or 
objective components of reasonable and 
probable grounds to arrest the applicants for 
possession of a controlled substance. 
.........
In this case, I find that the police officers, with 
all the information available to them at that time 
simply did not have enough grounds to arrest the 
applicants for possession of a controlled 
substance. There is a difference between unfairly 
second-guessing  the police officers, and 
subjecting the basis for the arrest of members of 
the public to a reasonable legal standard, which 
the police should always try to meet. [para. 
83-85]
Since the accused was not lawfully arrested the 
search of the vehicle was unlawful and breached s. 8 
of the Charter. However, the judge admitted the 
evidence under s. 24(2). Although she found the 
police acted without the required reasonable 
grounds to arrest, the police acted believing  they 
had the grounds primarily based on the two small 
white pebble like substances seen on the floor mat 
of the vehicle. In her view, the police officers were 
mistaken about the legal effect of the evidence 
available to them, but they did not fabricate the 
evidence in order to carry out a search of the 
vehicle. Nor did they act in bad faith. There was no 
flagrant police misconduct, systemic or institutional 
failure, or inadequate training. Plus the judge 
considered that the police were patrolling  a high 
crime area. The accused was convicted.
 
The accused then appealed his conviction and the 
pre-trial ruling  to the Ontario Court of Appeal. 
Whether or not there was a s. 9 breach, the Court of 
Appeal ruled the evidence would still be admissible 
under s. 24(2). The officers believed they had 
authority to arrest the accused.  The motions judge 
found that the officers acted in good faith.  She did 
not at any point reject their evidence that they 
believed they had the necessary grounds for 
arrest.  Furthermore, it was open to the judge to 
consider the fact that these events took place in a 
high crime area as part of her assessment of police 
conduct under s. 24(2).  The accused’s appeal was 
dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Editor’s Note: Facts and motion judge’s ruling 
taken from R. v. Deenah & Honnigan, [2007] O.J. 
No. 1298 (ONSCJ).
911 ENTRY, DETENTION, PAT 
DOWN & ARREST ALL LAWFUL
R. v. Mehari, 2011 ABCA 67
After being  assaulted and threatened 
with a knife, a young  woman 
escaped from an apartment and 
called 911. She told the 911 
operator that she believed her female 
acquaintance was still in the suite against her will 
with a number of black males, one of whom had a 
knife and threatened them with it. She was 
concerned for her friend’s safety. Two police officers 
interviewed the caller in person shortly after she 
made the 911 call. She did not know the apartment 
building’s address but described where the building 
was and how to get to the unit. One of the 
interviewing  officers was familiar with the building 
as described. It was known to him as a “run-down 
drug  flop-house type ... of apartment complex”. 
Backup officers were requested and they went 
upstairs using  the directions provided. They could 
hear men’s voices and music coming  from the suite. 
The officers were discussing  a course of action when 
a man attempted to exit the apartment. All four 
officers entered with their weapons drawn, having 
concerns for their safety and that of the woman they 
believed was being  held inside against her will. 
There were five men and a woman in the apartment. 
All were detained to investigate the unlawful 
confinement complaint. A caucasian man and 
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woman were released while the 
o t h e r f o u r m e n , a l l d a r k -
complexioned, were ordered to lay 
face-down on the floor and were 
handcuffed, while shotguns were 
trained on them. The apartment 
was sparsely furnished and drug 
paraphernalia and two cellular 
phones were in plain sight.
While one of the other men was 
patted down, the accused was observed moving  his 
hand from his back to his front right pocket. He 
repeated this gesture despite being  told to stop. 
Believing  he was in possession of a weapon, an 
officer patted the accused’s right front pocket, feeling 
a hard irregular object he believed to be a controlled 
substance. He was arrested for possessing  a 
controlled substance and searched. Police found 
38.9 grams of crack cocaine in rock form in a clear 
plastic baggie in his pocket and two tightly rolled 
bundles of currency totalling  $1,925. He was 
rearrested for trafficking  in a controlled substance 
and possessing  proceeds of crime. Neither the 
accused’s clothing  nor his appearance matched that 
of the knife-wielding  assailant described by the 
caller, but he was of somewhat similar height, skin 
colour, and age.
 
At trial in Alberta Provincial Court the judge ruled 
that the accused’s Charter rights had not been 
breached. She found the warrantless search was 
lawful since police had reasonable grounds to 
believe that an occupant was in distress and entry 
was necessary to protect life and prevent serious 
injury. In her view the 911 call and the subsequent 
interview of the caller provided such grounds. As for 
the lack of an actual address, it was irrelevant. The 
caller had provided specific information regarding 
the interior layout of the apartment building  which 
allowed the police to know the location complained 
of in the 911 emergency call. The 911 call also 
provided the authority necessary to subsequently 
detain and pat-down the accused. The police had 
reasonable grounds to detain him for investigative 
purposes and to suspect he may be connected to the 
crime alleged by the 911 caller. As for the search, it 
too was lawful. Although the power to detain for 
investigative purposes does not automatically give 
police the right to search an individual, 
the trial judge found that officer safety 
made it lawful to handcuff the accused 
and perform a pat-down search. The 
arresting  officer had both subjective and 
objective reasonable grounds to arrest the 
accused for possessing  a controlled 
substance and to search his pocket in 
relation to the crime for which he was 
arrested. The evidence was admitted and 
the accused was convicted of possessing 
cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.
The accused appealed, arguing  that the trial judge 
erred in holding  that: (1) the warrantless entry and 
search of the apartment was lawful; (2) the officers 
were entitled to conduct a pat-down search; and (3) 
the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to 
arrest him. Acknowledging  that these events 
occurred relatively quickly, the Court of Appeal 
noted there were four stages which culminated in 
the accused’s arrest for the drug offence:
 
I. the warrantless entry of the apartment in 
response to the 911 call;
II. the investigative detention;
III. the pat-down search; and
IV. the pocket search.
 
These stages involved challenges to both ss. 8 
(unreasonable search and seizure) and 9 (arbitrary 
detention) of the Charter.
Stage I: Warrantless Apartment Entry
In certain limited circumstances the police may 
enter a home without a warrant, such as when 
police are responding  to a 911 call. In such cases, 
“the importance of the police duty to protect life 
warrants and justifies a forced entry into a dwelling 
in order to ascertain the health and safety of a 911 
caller. The public interest in maintaining  an effective 
emergency response system is obvious and 
significant enough to merit some intrusion on a 
resident’s privacy interest. However, ... the intrusion 
must be limited to the protection of life and safety. 
The police have authority to investigate the 911 call 
and, in particular, to locate the caller and determine 
his or her reasons for making  the call and provide 
“The police may briefly 
detain a person where 
they have a reasonable 
suspicion that the 
person is implicated in 
a recent or ongoing 
criminal offence.”  
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such assistance as may be required. The police 
authority for being  on private property in response to 
a 911 call ends there. They do not have further 
permission to search premises or otherwise intrude 
on a resident’s privacy or property. [T]he interference 
must be necessary for carrying  out the police duty 
and it must be reasonable. A reasonable interference 
in circumstances such as an unknown trouble call 
would be to locate the 911 caller in the home. If this 
can be done without entering  the home with force, 
obviously such a course of action is 
mandated. Each case wi l l be 
considered in its own context, 
keeping  in mind all of the surrounding 
circumstances.” (citing R. v. Godoy)
So even though this case dealt not 
with the caller’s safety, but that of her 
friend, a higher threshold need not be 
placed upon the police before they 
act. “The decision to enter the 
premises ought not to be based upon 
the location of the caller,” said the 
Court of Appeal. “Rather, it should be based on the 
reasonableness of the decision to enter the premises 
assessed against all of the circumstances, notably the 
extent to which interference with individual liberties 
is necessary to perform the officer’s duty, the liberty 
interfered with and the nature and extent of the 
interference.” It was not necessary for the officer to 
have taken the caller to the neighbourhood and 
confirm the apartment building. The caller had given 
specific information about the location of the 
apartment within the building  and a description of 
the layout of the building  which enabled an officer 
to identify the building  and the apartment as one 
with which he was familiar. Nor did anything  turn 
on the fact the officers spent time in the hallway 
outside the apartment. “The officers were dealing 
with a complaint of a hostage situation where the 
caller had indicated that there were a number of 
men in the apartment, one of whom was armed with 
a knife,” said the Court of Appeal. “The decision to 
await backup was reasonable and the entry without 
backup was only prompted by one of the men 
leaving the apartment.”
Stage II: Investigative Detention
“The police may briefly detain a person where they 
have a reasonable suspicion that the person is 
implicated in a recent or ongoing  criminal offence,” 
said the Court. Citing  Mann, “police officers may 
detain an individual for investigative purposes if 
there are reasonable grounds to suspect 
in all the circumstances that the 
individual is connected to a particular 
crime and that such a detention is 
necessary.” The trial judge found that 
there were reasonable grounds to 
suspect that the accused may have been 
connected with the crime reported by 
the 911 caller. Even though his clothing 
did not match those described by the 
caller, there were valid reasons for the 
police suspicion: the accused had 
s i m i l a r s k i n c o l o u r a n d w a s 
approximately the same age as the man described 
by the caller; the reported crime involved stolen 
drugs; and the apartment was littered with drug 
paraphernalia. The initial detention was lawful, as 
was the accused’s continued detention through and 
including  the search. The purpose of the officers’ 
warrantless entry into the apartment was to 
investigate the confinement of a hostage. This would 
include the period of time during  which the police 
were confirming  the identities of the detainees in 
order to determine whether the knife-wielding 
suspect was in the apartment.
Stage III: Pat-down Search 
Where a person has been lawfully detained, a police 
officer may engage in a protective pat-down search 
of the individual. But unlike the search power 
incidental to arrest, the power to search incidental to 
an investigative detention is very narrow. “It arises 
from the general duty of the police to protect life,” 
“The police may 
briefly detain a 
person where they 
have a reasonable 
suspicion that the 
person is implicated in 
a recent or ongoing 
criminal offence.”  
“[A search incidental to an investigative detention] arises from the general duty of the 
police to protect life. It does not exist as a matter of course. The officer must believe on 
reasonable grounds that his safety or the safety of others is at risk.”  
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said the Court. “It does not exist as a 
matter of course. The officer must 
believe on reasonable grounds that his 
safety or the safety of others is at risk.” 
Here, the pat-down search did not go 
beyond the scope of what was 
authorized. The trial judge was satisfied 
tha t the pa t -down search was 
conducted for officer safety, even 
though the accused was face down and 
handcuffed behind his back. The officer 
was concerned that the accused was 
trying  to reach for something  in his 
pocket that might be a weapon.
 
Stage IV: Reasonable Grounds for Arrest
The police officer was acting  on more than merely a 
hunch or intuition that what he felt in the accused’s 
pocket was drugs. Reasonable grounds for an arrest 
“is based not only upon a police officer’s subjective 
belief, but also in light of what a reasonable person 
in the position of the officer would conclude.” In this 
case, the officer had previous 
experience in conducting  pat-
down searches and was familiar 
with the tactile sensation of 
touching  keys, wallets, money, 
cell phones and controlled 
drugs. There were also a number 
of objective factors including 
that the 911 call had described a 
dispute over missing  drugs, the 
apartment was littered with drug 
paraphernalia and the accused 
kept trying  to get at something  in 
his pocket. The trial judge applied the proper legal 
test. She correctly assessed both the subjective and 
objective elements of reasonable grounds.
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
“[Reasonable grounds for 
an arrest] is based not only 
upon a police officer’s 
subjective belief, but also 
in light of what a 
reasonable person in the 
position of the officer 
would conclude.”
The JIBC Foundation Gala on December 1, 2010 at the Hotel Vancouver. 
Heroes & Rescue Award winners Gala 2010
www.10-8.ca
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Agencies involved in 2010 
Olympic Security 
๏Abbotsford Police Department
๏Akwesasne Mohawk Police Service
๏Alberta Sheriffs Service
๏Barrie Police Service
๏BC Conservation Officer Service
๏Belleville Police Service
๏Brandon Police Service
๏Bridgewater Police
๏British Columbia Sheriffs Service
๏Bromont Police Service
๏Calgary Police Service
๏Camrose Police Service
๏Canadian Forces
๏Cape Breton Regional Police
๏Central Saanich Police Service
๏Charlottetown Police Department
๏Chatham-Kent Police Service
๏Cornwall Community Police 
Service
๏Corps of Commissionaires
๏Dakota Ojibway Police Service
๏Delta Police
๏Deux-Montagnes Police Service
๏Dryden Police Service
๏Durham Police Service
๏Edmonton Police Service
๏Estevan Police Service
๏Fredericton City Police Force
๏Gananoque Police Service
๏Granby Police Service
๏Greater Sudbury Police Service
๏Greater Vancouver South Coast 
Transit Authority Police Service
๏Guelph Police Service
๏Halifax Regional Police
๏Halton Regional Police Service
๏Hamilton Police Service
๏Hanover Police Service
๏Kawartha Lakes Police Service
๏Kingstons Police Service
๏Lac Seul Police Service
๏Lacombe Police Service
๏LaSalle Police Service
๏Laval Police Service
๏Lethbridge Police Service
๏London Metropolitan Police 
Service
๏London Police Service
๏Longueuil Police Service
๏Medicine Hat Police Service
๏Mont-Tremblant Police Service
๏Moose Jaw Police Service
๏Morden Police Service
๏Nelson Police Department
๏New Glasgow Police
๏New Westminster Police Service
๏Niagara Parks Police Service
๏Niagara Police Service
๏Nishnawbe-Aski Police Service
๏North Bay Police Service
๏Oak Bay Police Department
๏Ontario Provincial Police
๏Ottawa Police Service
๏Owen Sound Police Service
๏Oxford Police Service
๏Peel Regional Police Service
๏Perth Police Service
๏Peterborough-Lakefield 
Community Police Service
๏Police de Roussillon
๏Port Hope Police Service
๏Port Moody Police Department
๏Prince Albert Police Service
๏Rama Police Service
๏RCMP
๏Regina Police Service
๏Riviere-du-Loup Police Service
๏Rothesay Regional Police Force
๏Saanich Police Department
๏Saint John City Police Force
๏Saint-Georges Police Service
๏Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu Police 
Service
๏Sarnia Police Service
๏Saskatoon Police Service
๏Saugeen Shores Police Service
๏Sault Ste. Marie Police Service
๏Service de police de la ville de 
Montreal
๏Shelburne Police Service
๏Sherbrooke Police Service
๏South Simcoe Police Service
๏St Thomas Police Service
๏St-Eustache Police Service
๏Ste-Marie Police Service
๏Stirling-Rawdon Police Services
๏Stratford Police Service
๏Strathroy-Caradoc Police Service
๏Taber Police Service
๏Therese-de-Blainville Police 
Service
๏Thetford Mines Police Service
๏Thunder Bay Police Service
๏Timmins Police Service
๏Toronto Police Service
๏Treaty Three Police Service
๏Trenton Police Department
๏Trois-Rivieres Police Service
๏Truro Police
๏United Chiefs and Council of 
Manitoulin Anishnaabe Police 
Service
๏Vancouver Police Department
๏Victoria City Police Department
๏Ville De Quebec Police Services
๏Ville de Saguenay Police Service
๏Waterloo Regional Police Service
๏West Grey Police Service
๏West Nipissing Police Service
๏West Vancouver Police Department
๏Weyburn Police Service
๏Windsor Police Service
๏Wingham Police Service
๏Winkler Police Service
๏Winnipeg Police Service
๏York Regional Police Service
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PURPOSIVE APPROACH USED IN 
CARTRIDGE MAGAZINE 
INTERPRETATION 
R. v. Cancade, 2011 BCCA 105
The accused ordered seven magazine 
casings from a U.S. mail order 
supplier for delivery to a Canadian 
mailing  address. When he attempted 
to pick them up he was arrested. The 
magazine casings, sometimes referred to as shells or 
containers, had a 30-round capacity but did not 
have an internal spring, a bottom plate, or a follower 
plate, all parts that would be needed to be installed 
in order to make the casings functional as 
magazines.  The accused, knowledgeable in 
weapons, intended to make alterations to the casings 
so they would comply with Canadian law, which 
requires a casing  only have a maximum five (5) 
round capacity.  
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court the 
accused argued the casings were only components 
which could become either prohibited or lawful 
devices. Since the casings were simply the outside of 
a magazine, he submitted the objects seized were 
not operable and did not fall within the definition of 
a cartridge magazine. The Crown, on the other hand, 
suggested that the items as 
imported met the definition 
of a prohibited device, were 
c a p a b l e o f b e c o m i n g 
operable with the addition 
of readily available parts, 
and had not been altered 
be fo re impor t a t i on t o 
comply with the regulations. 
The trial judge ruled that the 
imported items fell within 
the definition of cartridge 
magazine contained in s. 84 
of the Criminal Code. In her 
view, the definition of cartridge magazine included 
the shell, or container, though not completely 
assembled into a functional magazine. “The fact that 
these casings were not immediately capable of 
feeding  ammunition into a firing  chamber without 
the addition of several parts is immaterial,” she said. 
“The modification required to make these shells 
functional was, by all accounts, simply the addition 
of three readily available and easily installed parts.” 
Convictions of importing  and possessing  a 
prohibited device followed. 
The accused then appealed, again submitting  that 
the casings were not prohibited under s. 84. He 
argued for a strict interpretive approach to the 
legislation. In his view, an object which has the 
future capacity with alternation and no present 
capacity to feed ammunition into the firing  chamber 
of a firearm was not a “cartridge magazine” in law. 
He submitted that by comparing  the French and 
English versions of the relevant weapons legislation 
it was clear that the verb used in the French version 
was present tense, meaning  the magazine needed 
present capacity. He suggested the trial judge erred 
when she found the word “may” in the English 
version spoke not only to a present capacity but also 
a future capacity. The Crown, however, contended 
that the French version of the definition could 
encompass a future ability of the device to be 
rendered easily serviceable to feed bullets into a 
firearm. In the Crown’s view, a purposive approach 
to construing  the legislation was needed, taking  into 
account the intent of Parliament to keep dangerous 
high capacity weapons out of public circulation.
Justice Hall, writing  for the unanimous 
British Columbia Court of Appeal, 
rejected the accused’s interpretive 
approach which would have supported 
a strict construction of the relevant 
provisions. Instead, he adopted a 
purposive approach to the legislation. “I 
consider a purposive approach to this 
legislative provision is the proper one to 
be adopted here ... in construing  this 
legislation having  regard to the 
intention of  Parliament to severely 
restrict the availability of high capacity 
weapons and their appurtenances,” said 
Justice Hall. The trial judge did not err in finding  the 
accused was in possession of a prohibited cartridge 
magazine and guilty of ss. 91(2), 92(2) and 104(1)(a) 
offences under the Criminal Code.  The accused’s 
appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
“[A] purposive approach to 
this legislative provision is the 
proper one to be adopted 
here ... in construing this 
legislation having regard to the 
intention of Parliament to 
severely restrict the availability 
of high capacity weapons and 
their appurtenances.”  
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CROSS-EXAMINATION 
PERMITTED TO ASSIST IN 
ASSESSING BASIS FOR WARRANT 
R. v. Vi, 2010 BCCA 496
The police obtained a search warrant 
for a home and found a marihuana 
grow operation. In British Columbia 
Provincial Court the accused sought 
to attack the validity of the warrant 
but his application to cross-examine the police 
officer who swore the Information to Obtain (ITO) 
before a judicial justice of the peace (JJP) was 
dismissed. The trial judge said that permission to 
cross-examine the informant would be granted if he 
was satisfied that it was necessary to enable the 
accused to make full answer and defence. Although 
the judge accepted that cross-examination would 
likely disclose that there was a good deal of 
information known to the informant that he did not 
disclose in the ITO, the judge opined that “it is not 
incumbent on an informant to put down everything 
he found or did not find, or pursued or did not 
pursue, in the course of his investigation. He need 
only provide facts which in total will support the 
issuance of the warrant, and the issuing  authority 
(here the [JJP]) is entitled to rely on the accuracy of 
those facts.” Since there was nothing  to indicate that 
the informant, a police officer with 25 years of 
police experience, would abandon or recant his 
averments in the ITO, the application to cross 
examine was denied. The accused was convicted of 
producing  marihuana and possessing  it for the 
purposes of trafficking. 
On appeal to the British Columbia Court of Appeal, 
the accused’s convictions were set aside and a new 
trial was ordered. Justice Donald, delivering  the 
unanimous Court of Appeal judgment, concluded 
the trial judge used the wrong  test. “If it were 
necessary to demonstrate that cross-examination will 
cause a deponent to concede he did not have 
reasonable grounds that an offence has occurred, a 
practically impossible task, then there would never 
be an opportunity to cross-examine on the 
information to obtain,” he said. ”All the defence 
must show is a reasonable likelihood that it will 
assist the court in assessing  the basis of the warrant.” 
In this case, the accused wanted to expose 
weaknesses in the ITO by demonstrating  that the 
officer did not make full and frank disclosure or his 
observations did not support reasonable grounds. 
But he was prevented from doing  so because the 
trial judge held that a informant need only put down 
enough to support the warrant, which, along  with 
the “recantation” test, found no support in law.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
ALTERNATIVE REASONING 
JUSTIFIES ADMISSION
R. v. Murray, 2011 ONCA 174
It is not unusual for courts to use 
alternative reasoning  in concluding 
that even though the police violated 
a person’s Charter r ights the 
evidence should nonetheless be 
admissible. A recent Ontario Court of Appeal 
decision provides an example of how courts use this 
approach. In this particular case the accused was 
appealing  his conviction. He was arguing  that his 
arrest was unlawful and therefore the drugs police 
seized should have been excluded as evidence 
against him: 
Assuming, without deciding, that the arrest of 
the [accused] in the circumstances was 
unlawful, given the knowledge the police 
officers had, they were fully justified in taking 
control of the [accused] and taking steps to 
ensure their safety as part of a lawful 
investigative detention. In this context, the 
police would have been entitled to conduct a 
protective pat-down search of the [accused]. 
Had this been done, the officers would 
inevitably have discovered a digital scale in the 
[accused’s] left pants pocket. They would also 
have felt a large bulge, soft in texture, in his right 
pants pocket. Further investigation would have 
revealed that the [accused] had eight prior 
trafficking and/or possession convictions. In 
combination, this would have afforded the 
police ample reasonable grounds to arrest and 
search the [accused], at which point the drugs in 
his right hand pocket would have been 
discovered.
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Thus, even if the police lacked reasonable 
grounds to arrest the [accused] when and as they 
did, he would have been lawfully arrested in any 
event and the drugs seized. Consequently, the 
impact on the [accused’s] Charter rights is 
minimal. Given that there is no finding that the 
police deliberately or flagrantly breached the 
[accused’s] Charter rights and having  regard to 
society’s interest in an adjudication on the 
merits, the evidence in our view would have 
been admitted. [paras. 1-2]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.courts.on.ca
JOINT SENTENCING 
SUBMISSION REJECTED
R. v. Thow, 2010 BCCA 538
After pleading  guilty to 20 counts of 
f raud over $5,000 in Br i t i sh 
Columbia Provincial Court, the 
accused was sentenced to nine years 
imprisonment on each of five counts 
and seven years on the remaining  15 counts with all 
the sentences to be served concurrently, less time 
spent in custody. The total amount of the frauds was 
more than $10 million. The nine year sentences 
were more than the seven years put forth in a joint 
submission of counsel. So the accused appealed.
Justice Low, delivering  the opinion of the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal, disagreed that the judge 
erred by imposing  a sentence greater than the joint 
submission. “It is well understood that a sentencing 
judge is not bound to follow a joint submission as to 
the appropriate sentence to be imposed but the 
judge should give appropriate weight to such a 
submission,” said Justice Low. “The court has an 
overriding  discretion and must impose a fit 
sentence.” In this case, the joint submission was 
presented in Provincial Court on the basis that the 
maximum sentence on each count of fraud was ten 
years. However, the maximum sentence for the five 
counts drawing  the nine year sentence had been 
raised to 14 years when parliament amended the 
Criminal Code. Thus, there was a legal flaw in the 
joint submission and, “as a matter of law, the 
sentencing  judge could not be bound by the legal 
fiction included in the joint submission that the 
maximum was ten years.” Nor was the sentencing 
judge required to invite further submissions when 
she determined that the maximum was higher for the 
five counts than submitted by counsel. “There was 
nothing  that could have been said by counsel,” said 
Justice Low. “The law had changed, the maximum 
penalty had been increased and the court had to 
give effect to the will of Parliament.” The accused’s 
appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
s. 150.1(4) CC: ‘ALL’ REASONABLE 
STEPS MUST BE TAKEN
R. v. Mastel, 2011 SKCA 16                    
 
The accused, a 41 year old male, 
met the complainant, a young  girl, 
when she was 13 years of age. Over 
the course of about two years they 
had numerous conversations with 
each other. When the accused was 43 he met the 
then 15 year old, grade 10 complainant at his home 
one evening. She drank some coolers he provided 
and the two ended up kissing. She then performed 
oral sex on him which was followed by intercourse. 
The accused was subsequently charged with sexual 
assault and sexual touching  of a person under the 
age of 16 contrary to the Criminal Code.  
At trial in Saskatchewan Provincial Court the judge 
found the accused had an honest belief the 
complainant was 16 years of age or older. The judge 
also found that this was a case in which no further 
inquiries were necessary to determine the age of the 
complainant even with the significant discrepancy in 
their ages.  
The Crown appealed the accused’s acquittal arguing 
the trial judge erred in law in his application of s.
150.1(4) of the Criminal Code and that the accused 
was required to take positive steps to ascertain the 
age of a potential sexual partner.  Here, the Crown 
submitted that that accused took no steps and was 
willfully blind to the fact that the complainant was 
underage.
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Justice Lane, authoring  the decision for the 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, agreed with the 
Crown that the the trial judge erred in law and 
misdirected himself as to the proper legal test under 
s. 150.1(4).  In a prosecution involving  s. 150.1(4) 
the Crown is required to prove the accused failed to 
take “all reasonable steps to ascertain the age of the 
complainant.” The word “all” is significant.   Here, 
the evidence failed to establish the accused took “all 
reasonable steps to ascertain the age of the 
complainant.”   As Justice Lane noted, the accused 
took no steps:
The requirement the accused take all reasonable 
steps to ascertain the age of the complainant 
was added to the Criminal Code to test “the 
foundation of an honest belief”.  
The requirement the accused take all reasonable 
steps is “more than a casual requirement. There 
must be an earnest inquiry or some other 
compelling factor that obviates the need for an 
inquiry” 
 
In this case, the evidence cannot lead to the 
conclusion the [accused] took all reasonable 
steps to ascertain the age of the complainant or 
that, in the circumstances, no steps were 
necessary. The [Crown] established the 
[accused] failed to take any steps to determine 
the age of the complainant and, on the 
evidence, it was palpable and overriding error 
for the trial judge to conclude that, in these 
circumstances, no steps were necessary.  The 
trial judge misdirected himself as to the 
interpretation and application of s.  150.1(4).  
[references omitted, paras. 20-22]
The Crown’s appeal was allowed, the accused’s 
acquittal was set aside, a conviction was entered, 
and the matter was sent back to the trial judge for 
sentencing.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Note-able Quote
“Do not follow where the path may lead. Go instead 
where there is no path and leave a trail.” - Ralph 
Waldo Emerson
SUBPOENA REQUIRES WITNESS 
TO ATTEND & TO GIVE 
EVIDENCE
R. v. Abdullah & Amyotte, 2010 MBCA 79        
In 2005 an innocent bystander was 
shot and killed in a gang-related 
shooting. Abdullah and Amyotte each 
gave a videotaped statement to the 
police identifying  the shooters. The 
shooters were charged with murder and other 
offences.  As  anticipated material witnesses, 
Abdullah and Amyotte were each served with a 
subpoena to attend to give evidence. But they 
refused to be sworn or affirmed and did not testify.  
The presiding  judge at the murder trial explained to 
each of the accused that they could be liable for 
contempt by refusing  to be sworn or affirmed, but he 
did not cite them for contempt of court, nor were 
they charged with contempt for refusing  to testify.  
However, each was subsequently charged with 
attempting  to obstruct justice under s. 139(2) of the 
Criminal Code by refusing  to testify and disobeying 
BY THE BOOK:
Mistake of Age
s. 150.1(4) Criminal Code
It is not a defence to a charge under 
section 151 [sexual interference] or 
152 [invitation to sexual touching], 
subsection 160(3) [bestiality in the 
presence of a child] or 173(2) 
[exposure], or section 271 [sexual 
assault], 272 [sexual assault with a weapon/cause 
bodily harm] or 273 [aggravated sexual assault] 
that the accused believed that the complainant 
was 16 years of age or more at the time the 
offence is alleged to have been committed unless 
the accused took all reasonable steps to ascertain 
the age of the complainant.
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a court order (“a subpoena that directed him to 
attend and give evidence”) under 127(1).   
At trial in Manitoba Provincial Court they were 
acquitted. Although satisfied the Crown had proven 
the actus reus for the offence of obstructing  justice, 
the judge had a reasonable doubt as to whether they 
had the necessary intention to attempt to obstruct 
justice. They both stated that their earlier videotaped 
statements were false and they did not want to 
perpetuate the lies by testifying  at the murder trial. 
On the charge of disobeying  a court order the judge 
was of the view that a subpoena issued under the 
Criminal Code only required the recipient to attend 
court; it did not require they testify.  “Although a 
subpoena is on its face a lawful order of the court, I 
am not satisfied that it actually directs a witness to 
testify,” she said. “An examination of the wording  of 
the sections appears to suggest that a subpoena is 
merely a court order that procures attendance for the 
purpose of testifying.  It does not appear to 
specifically order a person to testify.” Further, the 
trial judge also was of the view that the Crown had 
not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
accuseds had refused to testify. “The wording  of the 
particular offence … required … proof of an actual 
refusal to testify as opposed to a simple lack of 
testimony,” she said. The Crown appealed the trial 
judge’s ruling to the Manitoba Court of Appeal. 
Attempt to Obstruct Justice
If a person does not fulfill their duty to testify they 
can be cited or charged for contempt of court. 
Although a finding  of contempt followed by 
sentencing  is the usual outcome, it is not the only 
consequence.  “A person who is obliged to testify, 
but refuses to be sworn or affirmed to give evidence, 
can also be charged with obstruction of justice 
pursuant to s. 139(2) of the Code,” said Justice 
Hamilton, authoring  the unanimous appeal 
judgment. “In such event, the Crown must prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of the 
offence (the actus reus and the mens rea).” The Court 
of Appeal concluded that the trial judge erred when 
she found the Crown had not proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the accuseds had the 
necessary intent to attempt to obstruct justice by 
refusing to be sworn or affirmed to testify:
Being a specific intent offence, the accused must 
not only intend to act in a way that tends to 
obstruct, pervert or defeat the course of justice, 
but he must specifically intend to obstruct, 
pervert or defeat the course of justice by his acts.  
What this means is that the acts in question must 
have been done with the purpose of perverting 
or obstructing  the course of justice or with 
knowledge or awareness that the acts in 
question would or might lead to a perversion or 
obstruction of justice.
In tent ion i s not to be confused wi th 
motive. Motive is the reason why someone does 
something.  It is possible to have a specific 
intention for doing an act that is different from 
the motive for that same act.  If a person robs a 
bank to pay for medical treatment, the intention 
would be to commit the offence of robbery, 
while the payment of the medical expenses 
would be the motive.   Motive is not an element 
that the Crown must prove, so it is important to 
differentiate between the required intention, 
which forms a part of the offence that the Crown 
must prove, and motive, which does not.  In this 
case, the accused stated that they did not want 
to testify because of safety concerns for their 
families and because they did not want to be 
branded as rats within their gang. These are both 
clearly motives.  The accused also offered, as a 
reason for not testifying, that they did not want 
to lie and that the videotaped statements were 
false.  ...
Intention should also not be confused with 
desiring or wanting a particular outcome.  A 
person can intend a particular outcome, in the 
sense that he or she knows or foresees it, even if 
he or she does not want or desire that it occur.  
[references omitted, paras. 39-41]
DUTY TO TESTIFY
“A person has a general duty to testify when 
called upon to do so, except in clearly defined 
cases (as fo r examp le , spousa l non -
compellability). ... This duty is owed not just to 
the courts, but to society as a whole, and is 
essential to the proper administration of 
justice.” [at para. 34] “The duty to testify has no 
discretion attached to it.” [at para. 58] - R. v. Abdullah 
& Amyotte, 2010 MBCA 79.                       
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Here, the refusal to testify due of the untruthfulness 
of their videotaped statements made to police might 
have explained the reason or motive for not 
testifying, but it could not have raised a reasonable 
doubt about the intent to attempt to obstruct justice. 
Justice Hamilton continued:
Abdullah and Amyotte were not charged with 
wilfully attempting  to obstruct justice for refusing 
to tes t i fy about a t ruthful videotaped 
statement.  They were charged with wilfully 
attempting  to obstruct justice for refusing  to 
testify.  Simply put, the truthfulness or falsity of 
the videotaped statements was irrelevant to these 
charges.  Even if the videotaped statements had 
been put into evidence before the trial judge and 
she was able to determine that the statements 
were indeed false, Abdullah and Amyotte would 
not have been relieved from fulfilling  their duty 
as witnesses and giving truthful testimony.  
The failure or refusal of an accused to testify 
because he does not want to lie on the stand by 
“standing  by” an earlier false statement given to 
the police is simply not capable, in law, of 
raising a reasonable doubt about his or her 
specific intent to wilfully obstruct the course of 
justice. A witness in a trial is put on the stand to 
tell the truth, not to perpetuate a lie or to “stand 
by” earlier lies.  A person cannot refuse to be 
sworn or affirmed to give testimony for the 
purpose of not perpetuating a lie without also 
intending  to obstruct the course of justice.  In 
doing so, the clear inference is that the person 
intended or knew that his acts would tend to 
obstruct the course of justice, whatever the 
stated motive or desired outcome. [paras. 56-57]
And further:
Even if Abdullah and Amyotte honestly believed 
that they were required to testify at the [murder] 
trial in a manner consistent with their earlier 
videotaped statements, and therefore did not 
testify in order to prevent what they contend 
would have been an injustice, such a 
misunderstanding would be characterized as a 
mistake of law (and not a mistake of fact) and 
would provide no defence. Ignorance of the law 
is no excuse for the commission of a crime.   See 
s.  19 of the Code.  More specifically, ignorance 
of the law will not afford a defence to a charge 
of wilfully attempting to obstruct the course of 
justice. [reference omitted, para. 59]
The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittals and 
entered convictions for attempting  to obstruct 
justice. 
Disobeying a Court Order 
Subpoenas were served on both Abdullah and 
Amyotte pursuant to the Criminal Code. The 
subpoenas commanded them to appear “to give 
evidence”.  The Court of Appeal found the trial judge 
erred in holding  that a subpoena only compels a 
witness to attend court, but does not compel the 
witness to testify. A subpoena has a dual purpose. It 
requires the witness “to attend” and “to give 
evidence.”  
As for the trial judge distinguishing  between not 
testifying  and refusing  to testify, the Court of Appeal 
also concluded that she erred in this respect. “Given 
BY THE BOOK:
Obstructing Justice
s. 139(2) Criminal Code
Every one who wilfully attempts in 
any manner … to obstruct, pervert 
or defeat the course of justice is 
guilty of an indictable offence and 
liable to imprisonment for a term 
not exceeding ten years. 
Disobeying a Court Order
s. 127(1) Criminal Code
Every one who, without lawful excuse, disobeys 
a lawful order made by a court of justice … is, 
unless a punishment or other mode of 
proceeding  is expressly provided by law, guilty 
of (a)  an indictable offence and liable to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding two 
years; …
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that a subpoena requires a witness to both attend 
and testify and that a subpoena is an order of the 
court, a person who has been subpoenaed and who 
declines to take an oath or affirmation and declines 
to testify does so in disobedience to a court order,” 
said Justice Hamilton. She continued:
Thus, by refusing  to take an oath or affirmation, 
Abdullah and Amyotte did not testify or “give 
evidence” and thereby disobeyed the 
subpoena.  The actus reus of the offence was 
complete. No specific “refusal” to testify is 
required at law to found the essential elements 
of the offence of disobeying a court order, which 
is a general intent offence.   The court order here 
was the subpoena that directed the accused to 
“attend to give evidence.”  All the Crown was 
required to prove with respect to each accused 
was that he knew that there was a court order 
requiring him to give evidence and that he 
voluntarily did not give evidence. The evidence, 
accepted by the trial judge, was that Abdullah 
and Amyotte had been served with subpoenas 
which required them to attend to give evidence.  
Both attended, but declined to be sworn or 
a f f i r m e d , t h e r e by d e c l i n i n g  t o g i v e 
testimony.  The offence was complete here as 
soon as they declined to be sworn or affirmed to 
testify. [para. 82]
The accuseds’ acquittals for disobeying  a court order 
were also set aside and verdicts of guilty were 
imposed. However, both the obstruct justice offence 
and the disobey court order offence stemmed from 
the same conduct and were comprised of 
substantially the same elements. As a result, the 
disobey a court order convictions were stayed 
pursuant to the Kienapple principle. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Side Bar
“Other Mode of Proceeding”
The Manitoba Court of Appeal also ruled that the 
charge of attempting to obstruct justice did not fall 
within the proviso under s. 127(1) of the Criminal 
Code as an “other mode of proceeding … expressly 
provided by law.” Therefore, a charge under s. 127(1) 
was available and a conviction could be entered. 
While the charge of attempting to obstruct justice 
can be another mode of proceeding to address 
the same conduct as the charge of disobeying a 
court order, it is not an “other” Code offence that 
“expressly provides” another punishment or 
proceeding for “disobeying a court order.”  
Rather, it expressly provides a punishment or 
proceeding for attempting to obstruct justice, an 
offence that contemplates many different types of 
conduct.  Thus, ... s. 139(2) does not fall within the 
meaning of the proviso in s. 127(1) and the 
Crown was entitled to prosecute the accused 
under both ss. 139(2) and 127(1). [para. 97]
However, the Court noted that had Abdullah or 
Amyotte failed to attend court, rather than refused 
to testify, as required by the subpoena, the proviso 
would seem to apply. Section 708 of the Criminal 
Code states that “a person who, being required by 
law to attend or remain in attendance for the 
purpose of giving evidence, fails, without lawful 
excuse, to attend or remain in attendance 
accordingly is guilty of contempt of court.” A person 
can be fined  up to $100 and/or be imprisoned for 
up to 90 days. R. v.  Abdullah & Amyotte, 2010 MBCA 79
LEARNING LEGAL LINGO: Kienapple Principle
 
“[F]or the Kienapple rule to apply: there must be both a factual and legal nexus between the 
several charges.   Multiple convictions are only precluded under the Kienapple principle if they 
arise from the same “cause”, “matter”, or “delict”, and if there is sufficient proximity between the 
offences charged. This requirement of sufficient proximity between offences will only be 
satisfied if there is no additional and distinguishing element contained in the offence for which a 
conviction is sought to be precluded by the Kienapple principle.” —  R. v. Prince, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 480
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ELIMINATION RATE & PLATEAU: 
ASSERTIONS OF SCIENTIFIC 
KNOWLEDGE
R. v. Paszczenko; R. v. Lima, 2010 ONCA 615
Paszczenko was arrested after police 
attended a motor vehicle accident 
involving  a rear-end collision. He 
displayed the usual symptoms of 
drinking  – a strong  smell of alcohol; 
unsteadiness on his feet; bloodshot and glassy eyes; 
and slurred speech. He provided two breath samples 
registering  125mg% and 122mg%. Both readings 
were truncated (read down) to 120mg%. Since both 
samples were not taken within two hours of the 
offence the Crown was not entitled to rely upon the 
presumption set out in s. 258(1)(c) of the Criminal 
Code. Section 258(1)(c) provides that the results of 
breath tests are proof of the concentration of alcohol 
in an accused’s blood at the time of the 
offence.  Instead, the Crown tendered an expert’s 
toxicology report that projected the accused’s blood 
alcohol content (BAC) to have been between 130mg
% and 180mg% at the relevant time.  
At trial in the Ontario Court of Justice the accused’s 
argument that the “rate of elimination” and the 
“plateau” assumptions had not been proven was 
rejected. The judge applied the best evidence rule to 
the expert’s report and accepted the calculations set 
out in it. The accused was convicted of over 80mg%. 
On appeal by the accused to the Ontario Superior 
Court of Justice his conviction was set aside. The 
appeal judge concluded that there was no 
evidentiary basis upon which the trial judge could 
accept and rely upon the plateau assumption.  
Lima failed an approved screening  device test. He 
also exhibited common indicia of impairment. There 
was an odour of alcohol on his breath, his eyes were 
glassy, and his speech slightly slurred. He was taken 
to a police station where he provided two samples of 
his breath registering  readings of 118mg% and 
103mg%, truncated to 110mg% and 100mg%. The 
tests were administered more than two hours after 
the occurrence because a Portuguese language duty 
counsel lawyer was needed. The Crown could not 
rely on the s. 258(1)(c) presumption so an expert’s 
toxicology report was filed which projected a BAC of 
between 110mg% and 160mg% at the time of the 
incident. 
At trial in the Ontario Court of Justice the judge 
concluded that the Crown had proven there was no 
bolus or post-incident drinking  and that the 
elimination rate and plateau assumptions were so 
widely used and acknowledged in the toxicologist’s 
area of expertise that there was no need to lead 
evidence to support them. The accused was 
convicted of over 80mg%. On appeal by the 
accused to the Ontario Superior Court his conviction 
was upheld. 
Issue
Both of these cases were appealed to the Ontario 
Court of Appeal. In each case the toxicology experts 
relied on four assumptions in their reports when 
calculating  the BAC’s of each accused. These 
assumptions were; (1) no bolus drinking, (2) no post- 
incident drinking, (3) elimination rate, and (4) 
plateau. In Lima the accused attacked the proof 
required to establish the “no bolus drinking” 
assumption (proof of the “plateau” and the 
“elimination rate” assumptions were also alive), 
while the Crown appeal in Paszczenko centred on 
proof of the “plateau” and the “elimination rate” 
assumptions. 
The Crown bears the onus to prove the facts 
underlying  an expert’s report, including  the 
assumptions upon which the expert relies. But how 
is Crown required to prove these assumptions?  Put 
another way, in what manner is the Crown required 
to prove the facts underlying  the four assumptions 
used in expert toxicology reports for over 80mg% 
cases when the Crown is precluded from relying 
upon the presumption contained in s. 258(1)(c)? That 
was the question the Ontario Court of Appeal was 
tasked with deciding. The results of these cases are 
summarized in the following  evidential grid (at p. 
28). As a result, the Crown’s appeal in Paszczenko 
was allowed, the order for a new trial was set aside, 
and his conviction was restored. With Lima, his 
appeal was dismissed and his conviction upheld.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
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OVER 80 mg% STANDARD ASSUMPTIONS EVIDENTIARY GRID
Assumption Description Proof
No bolus drinking Bolus drinking generally describes the 
consumption of large quantities of alcohol 
immediately or shortly before driving. In such 
cases, a driverʼs BAC may have been below 
80mg% at the time of driving/care or control 
but still register an over 80mg% in a read-
back calculation done later because the BAC 
was still rising at the time of the incident. 
Thus, no bolus drinking means there was no 
rapid consumption of large quantities of 
alcoholic beverages shortly prior to the 
incident.
Burden on Crown to prove by case specific 
evidence (foundational facts). 
Crown must establish that an accused has 
not engaged in bolus drinking. A trier of fact 
(judge or jury) may rely on a common 
sense inference that people do not 
normally ingest large amounts of alcohol 
just prior to, or while, driving. Bolus drinking 
is a relatively rare phenomenon and no 
bolus drinking is largely a matter of 
common knowledge and common sense 
about how people behave. 
To overcome the common sense inference, 
there is a practical evidentiary burden on 
an accused. This does not require an 
accused persuade or convince the judge or 
jury there was bolus drinking, but merely to 
point to something in the evidence that puts 
the possibility they engaged in bolus 
drinking. So, in cases where there is no 
evidence of bolus drinking the common 
sense inference there was no bolus 
drinking may be drawn.
No post-incident drinking No alcohol consumption took place after the 
incident but prior to the breathalyzer tests.
Burden on Crown to prove by case specific 
evidence (foundational facts). 
Elimination rate The elimination of alcohol from the body 
generally continues at a relatively constant 
rate which ranges from approximately 10mg
% to approximately 20mg% per hour.
An assertion of scientific knowledge that 
need not be proven by case specific 
evidence led at trial. Rather, it is a matter of  
scientific knowledge on which the expert is 
entitled to rely without further proof by the 
Crown. The elimination rate is information 
acted upon by an expert as a result of their 
expertise. 
Plateau After the BAC rises rapidly within 
approximately 30 minutes of the last drink a 
personʼs BAC will remain at a relatively 
constant plateau for approximately two hours, 
before declining. The BAC plateau is a period 
of time in which there is no significant change 
in the BAC due to the rate of absorption of 
alcohol into the body being approximately 
equal to the rate of elimination of alcohol from 
the body. The BAC is neither rising nor falling 
and the assumed elimination rate is not 
factored into the read-back calculation which 
favours an accused.
An assertion of scientific knowledge that 
need not be proven by case specific 
evidence led at trial. Rather, it is a matter of  
scientific knowledge on which the expert is 
entitled to rely without further proof by the 
Crown. Plateau is information acted upon 
by an expert as a result of their expertise.
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BREACHING INFORMER 
PRIVILEGE RESULTS IN STAY
R. v. X.Y., 2011 ONCA 259
The accused was arrested and, while 
being  interviewed, asked that the 
recording  equipment be turned off. 
The master recording  system was 
turned off but a secondary system 
continued to operate and recorded 
the entire interview.  Assured that the conversation 
was no longer being  recorded, the accused 
disclosed that he was an an informer and identified 
his police handler. At the end of the interview the 
officer turned over the recording  disk of the 
interview to an administrative assistant for 
transcription. When the officer received the 
transcription of the interview it was obvious that the 
discussion about the informer activities had been 
recorded and transcribed. However, he had done 
nothing  in the interim to confirm or refute the 
accused’s claim to be a police informer and simply 
included the full transcript in the materials provided 
to the prosecutor for disclosure to defence counsel. 
The officer never spoke to a superior officer about 
the “off record” discussion, never sought legal 
advice from the Crown, nor took any steps to ensure 
the confidentiality of the informer discussion. The 
full transcript was turned over to the prosecutor. The 
prosecutor did not ask the police about the 
accused’s informer discussion or whether any steps 
had been taken to confirm the claim. The transcript, 
in both electronic and paper form, was turned over 
to various defence counsel as part of disclosure. 
More than a year later, when the prosecutor told 
defence counsel that the Crown intended to voir dire 
the accused’s interview, the breach of informer 
privilege was pointed out.  The prosecutor quickly 
tried to recover all documents that contained the 
text of the interview and notified the accused that 
the interview would not be tendered for admission 
as evidence at trial. The accused sought entry into 
the wi tness pro tec t ion program but was 
rejected.  While in custody he was assaulted. The 
attacker told him he had seen some disclosure and 
called him a “rat”. Threats of future harm were also 
made.
           
The accused made a pre-trial motion in the Ontario 
Superior Court of Justice seeking  a stay of 
proceedings on the basis of abuse of process for the 
official misconduct in breaching  informer privilege. 
But this was rejected. The trial judge found the 
police and prosecutorial conduct in disclosing  the 
full interview was inadvertent and unintentional. 
Continuing  the prosecution would not result in an 
unfair trial, nor have any material effect on the case 
because of the significant and diligent efforts the 
prosecutor made to remedy the breach and  attempt 
to reconstitute the privilege.  In the judge’s view, 
there was nothing  that would suggest a repetition of 
the investigative and prosecutorial conduct in the 
future and the societal interest in a trial on the merits 
of the charges tipped the scales against entering  a 
stay of proceedings.
OBSERVE & REPORT
What assisted the common sense 
inference against bolus drinking being 
drawn in the Lima case? It hinged much on 
the evidence of police. Here are some of 
the factors the Ontario Court of Appeal 
considered:
• he was stopped while driving his 
vehicle in an unusual fashion;
• he exhibited signs of driving while 
intoxicated at the time (smell of 
alcohol on his breath; red, bloodshot 
and glassy eyes; flushed face);
• there was no alcohol in his car, and he 
had no access to alcohol from the 
time of his arrest to the time of the 
breathalyzer tests;
• there was no change in the indicia of 
alcohol consumption during the period 
b e t w e e n h i s a r r e s t a n d t h e 
administration of the breathalyzer 
tests; and 
• there was no evidence he had just 
come from an establishment serving 
alcoholic beverages.
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On appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal, a stay 
was entered for several reasons:
• The police and prosecutorial conduct in 
breaching  informer privilege was grossly 
negligent. Both the police and prosecution are 
under a duty to protect informer privilege and 
defaulted on their obligations by disclosing  the 
accused’s status and some of the information 
provided.  Even if the recording  was done 
inadvertently, it was clear the transcript included 
significantly more than the brief preliminary 
questioning  about the offence charged.  “The 
officer who received the transcript was at the 
interview, thus knew the nature of the 
discussion that took place,” said the Court of 
Appeal. “The officer did nothing  to ensure that 
informer privilege was not breached. The officer 
took no steps to separate the informer activities 
discussion from the rest of the interview, for 
example, to place it in a sealed packet, to solicit 
the advice of senior officers, to seek legal advice 
from the prosecutor or even to confirm the 
informer status of the [accused]. When the 
prosecutor received the interview transcript 
from the police, the earlier breach of privilege 
was exacerbated. The prosecutor took no steps 
to confirm the [accused’s] status as an informer, 
or edit the interview before disclosure to several 
defence counsel.  In the result, disclosure 
included material that not only revealed the 
[accused’s] activities as an informer, but 
included the substance of what the [accused] 
disclosed during the interview.” 
• Informer privilege is a class privilege and 
protects not only an individual informer from 
possible retribution, but also lets potential 
informers know that their identity will also be 
protected. Although the trial judge had evidence 
of retribution, actual and promised, he “did not 
consider the overall impact of the disclosure 
such as occurred here on current and 
prospective informers. Official conduct such as 
occurred here could have a significant impact 
on future disclosures by current and prospective 
informers to the detriment of the administration 
of justice overall.”
• Once informer privilege has been lost it cannot 
be restored to its original vitality.  In this case, 
the trial judge attached too much significance to 
the prosecutor’s attempts to   remedy the breach 
and reinvigorate the privilege.  
Because of this stay, the accused was ordered 
released from custody.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
MORE ON INFORMER PRIVILEGE
 
Here are some more points the Court of Appeal 
made about Informer Privilege in R. v. X.Y.:
• Informer privilege provides an all but absolute 
bar against revealing any information that might 
tend to identify a confidential informer. 
• Courts have no discretion once the existence 
of the privilege is established. 
• The duty imposed to keep an informer’s 
identity confidential applies to the police and to 
the prosecutor.
• A judge is under a duty to protect the 
informer’s identity. 
• Informer privilege accords no place for the 
judicial balancing of benefits enuring from the 
privilege against any countervailing 
considerations.
• Since the privilege is jointly “owned” by the 
Crown and the informer, the Crown has no 
right to disclose the informer’s identity without 
the informer’s consent. 
• The principle does not permit the Crown to 
reveal any information that might tend to 
identify an informer as part of the Crown’s 
disclosure obligations.
• Even the right to make full answer and 
defence, of which the right to disclosure is an 
essential feature, does not alone trigger an 
exception to informer privilege.
• Informer privilege is not a rule of evidence, 
confined to the courtroom. Rather, it is an 
amalgam of an evidentiary rule and a principle 
of immunity and secrecy at work not only in, 
but also outside judicial proceedings.
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SHORT CoUrT CORNER:
Small on Facts, Big on Principle
Here is a quick taste of some recent appellate 
court decisions. If you are interested in what you 
read the entire judgments are available online at 
www.canlii.org 
BABY-SITTER MAY CHALLENGE 
WARRANT
A trial judge did not err when he 
gave standing  to a baby-sitter to 
attack a search warrant. Whether a 
person has a reasonable expectation 
of privacy for s. 8  of the Charter is context driven. 
The accused was in the premises at the time of the 
search and the trial judge found that he had 
possession and control and the ability to admit or 
exclude others from the premises in the context of 
his baby-sitting  duties. Ontario Court of Appeal: R. 
v. Pham, 2011 ONCA 271.
ILLEGAL STRIKE NOT STATE 
MISCONDUCT
The accused was facing  six charges 
when he was remanded for a bail 
hearing. Unfortunately, the return 
date for his bail hearing  coincided 
with an illegal strike at the detention 
centre and his bail hearing  did not proceed. A few 
days later his surety did not appear and he was not 
released on his own recognizance. Later, while the 
accused was still in custody, the trial judge stayed 
the charges after finding  the four day delay breached 
the state’s obligation to bring  the accused before the 
court in a timely manner and deprived him of his 
right to retain and properly communicate with 
counsel. Although the trial would not be unfair, the 
judge found the accused’s ability to make full 
answer and defence was impacted and the conduct 
of the correctional officers in mounting  an illegal 
strike was an affront to the administration of justice 
such as to shock the conscience of the community. 
On appeal, the Ontario Court of Appeal disagreed. 
The stay of proceedings was set aside because there 
was no evidence that state misconduct caused or 
contributed to the illegal strike by detention centre 
staff. “The illegal strike, standing  alone, is not state 
misconduct,” said the Court. Plus, the delay was 
relatively brief, there was no evidence the accused 
was actually prejudiced, and the state did not 
conduct itself in a manner that rendered the 
proceeding  unfair or otherwise damage the integrity 
of the judicial system. The accused was given seven 
days to surrender or a warrant would be issued. 
Ontario Court of Appeal: R. v. Ward, 2011 ONCA 
267.
BREATH TESTS ADMISSIBLE 
EVEN IF RIGHTS BREACHED
Even if the accused’s s. 10(b) Charter 
r i g h t s w e r e v i o l a t e d , t h e 
breathalyzer tests she provided of 
130mg% and 120mg% would 
nonetheless be admissible under s. 
24(2). An Ontario Court of Justice held the accused’s 
right to counsel was not breached and convicted 
her. On appeal, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice 
jumped past the s. 10 (b) determination and went 
directly to a s. 24(2) enquiry. He noted that a breach 
of s. 10(b) does not necessary lead to the virtual 
automatic exclusion of breath tests. There was no 
suggestion the arresting  officer acted in bad faith. He 
gave the accused the standard advice that had been 
developed to conform with Supreme Court of 
Canada judgments. He was not acting  in an abusive 
or high handed manner. And he never re-advised the 
accused of her rights at the police station because 
she made it clear she would not contact counsel due 
to the late hour. Furthermore, the havoc caused by 
drinking  and driving  remains a matter of wide public 
concern. The tests were reliable, they were not 
borderline, and were essential to the Crown’s case. 
The appeal judge found the readings admissible. A 
further appeal was dismissed by the Ontario Court of 
Appeal. It agreed with the appeal judge. Ontario 
Court of Appeal: R. v. Jackson, 2011 ONCA 279. 
“The illegal strike, standing alone, 
is not state misconduct.”
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FLIGHT FROM POLICE MAY BE 
PROBATIVE OF GUILT
After receiving  a 911 call reporting  a 
suspicious person circling  four cars 
and scraping  sounds being  heard, 
police saw the accused briskly 
walking  away from a vehicle. When 
he looked over his shoulder he broke into a run. An 
officer yelled for him to stop but he continued to run 
until a police dog  caught him. In considering  the 
totality of the evidence and finding  the accused 
guilty of mischief, the trial judge included the 
evidence of this flight from police. “Taking  flight 
from a uniformed police officer with a dog, 
especially when ordered to stop, was consistent with 
a consciousness that he had been observed 
committing  an offence,” said the trial judge. The 
accused appealed. He submitted before the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal, among  other things, that 
the reason he ran was because he was scoping 
vehicles to find something  of value to steal. Thus, his 
unusual post-offence conduct was equally consistent 
with prowling  vehicles and should therefore not 
have been considered in finding  him guilty of the 
mischief. Justice Kirkpatrick, delivering  the opinion 
for the Court of Appeal, disagreed. The accused did 
not testify at trial nor admit to any offence, and the 
trial judge did not place undue emphasis on the 
accused’s flight. Properly considered, it was among 
several pieces of circumstantial and direct evidence 
probative of the accused’s culpability. British 
Columbia Court of Appeal: R. v. Kim, 2011 BCCA 
127. 
911 CALL ADMISSIBLE AS 
EVIDENCE
The accused and his live-in girlfriend 
engaged in a physical altercation at 
their residence following  a night of 
drinking  at a bar. The complainant 
was badly injured. She called 911 shortly after 
midnight. She was moaning  and crying. When asked 
who hurt her, she responded “my boyfriend”. She 
gave the operator the accused’s name, spelled it, and 
gave details of his appearance. She said her head 
was split open, that “there is blood everywhere,” and 
that “I got beat bad”. The complainant was 
transported to hospital where she told the police that 
she had been hit on the head with a hammer. At trial 
in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench the 
complainant had no independent memory of the 
911 call, nor could she recall her conversation with 
the police at the hospital. The emergency room 
physician described the complainant’s injuries. The 
accused said he acted in self defence. After the 
complainant had bitten his penis he pushed her and 
she struck her head on the wall or door frame. He 
denied striking  her on the head with a hammer. The 
judge admitted the 911 call and the complainant’s 
statement to police. The accused was convicted of 
assault with a weapon and aggravated assault but 
appealed. Although his appeal was allowed on other 
grounds, the Alberta Court of Appeal found the 911 
call and the statements the complainant made to 
police admissible. The trial judge took into account 
the complainant’s level of intoxication and found 
that the 911 call revealed that she was not so 
incapacitated that her replies on the tape were 
unreliable. The 911 call was placed shortly after the 
assault and was thus sufficiently contemporaneous 
to be a spontaneous outburst which could not have 
been concocted. As a result, it formed part of the res 
gestae and was properly admitted as such. 
Furthermore, the statements were properly admitted 
through the principled approach to hearsay 
evidence. The 911 call met the test of necessity 
because the complainant had little memory of the 
assault. It also met the test of threshold reliability 
given the confirming  evidence of the witnesses in 
the bar, the fact that the call had been recorded, and 
that the complainant’s  statements were confirmed to 
some extent by the photographic and medical 
evidence. The statements were recorded in a 
“reasonably diligent manner”, there was no 
evidence of bias, the questions were not leading  nor 
suggestive, and the statements were consistent in 
material respects to the 911 call. Alberta Court of 
Appeal: R. v. Villeda, 2011 ABCA 85.
“Taking flight from a uniformed 
police officer with a dog, especially 
when ordered to stop, was consistent 
with a consciousness that he had been 
observed committing an offence.”
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OFFICER’S OBSERVATION MORE 
THAN FLEETING GLANCE
The accused was seen by an off-duty 
police officer as a passenger in a car 
passing  something  to a male near a 
phone booth. This activity fit the 
profile of a drug  transaction. The 
next day the accused was chased by the same 
officer, now on-duty, for running  a stop sign, but did 
not pull over. Instead he fumbled around with 
something  in his car as he fled. When he was 
stopped and searched the police found cash and a 
cell phone. Ten to fifteen minutes later a ziplock bag 
containing  seven cocaine spitballs was found on the 
road which the accused had just passed in his 
vehicle. The next day the officer answered a call 
placed to the accused’s telephone asking  to 
purchase a “spit ball”. The accused was convicted of 
possessing  cocaine for the purpose of trafficking  and 
failing  to stop for police in the Yukon Supreme 
Court. His appeal, however, was rejected. Justice 
Ryan, for a unanimous Appeal Court, disagreed with 
the submission that the officer’s identification of the 
accused as a passenger the day before his arrest was 
unreliable. “Because he thought he had witnessed a 
drug  deal, [the officer] made a point of observing 
who was in the Toyota,” stated Justice Ryan. “He said 
that he saw the same person the next day in the 
Toyota, now as driver, and that that person was [the 
accused]. This is not a case of a fleeting  glance. [The 
officer] made a point of observing  who was in the 
vehicles. In these circumstances the trial judge was 
entitled to accept and rely on [the officer’s] 
observations as part of the overall circumstances of 
the case.” Furthermore, the significance of the drugs 
being  found on the roadway, after the accused was 
arrested, was examined in context. Although such 
evidence on its own might be open to question, “the 
trial judge did not look at the individual items of 
evidence in isolation one from the other, but 
examined it as he is mandated to do, as a whole. 
When examined as a whole, the bits of evidence 
took on a larger meaning  for the trial judge.” The 
accused’s conviction was not unreasonable. Yukon 
Court of Appeal: R. v. Guan, 2011 YKCA 3.
TOP ONTARIO COURT REFUSES 
TO FUDGE SENTENCING 
NUMBERS
The accused was convicted of 
criminal negligence causing  death 
while street racing  and failing  to 
stop at the scene of an accident. 
Although both offences attract a 
maximum punishment of life imprisonment the 
accused was sentenced to 25 months in prison (30 
months less 5 months for time spent in pre-trial 
custody) on the criminal negligence count and 12 
months consecutive for the failing  to stop count, for 
a total of 37 months. Because he received a 
sentence of two years or more, under Canada’s 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act the accused 
would not be entitled to appeal the deportation 
order he was facing  as a result of the sentence he 
received on the criminal negligence causing  death 
conviction. So he asked the Ontario Court of Appeal 
to realign his sentences so he would not be barred 
from appealing  a deportation order. He did not want 
an overall global reduction in his total 37 month 
sentence. He merely wanted the individual 
sentences rejigged so no single sentence exceeded 
two years. He requested that the criminal negligence 
sentence be reduced to 23 months and the fail to 
stop sentence be increased to 14 months (19 months 
less 5 months for time spent in pre-trial custody) - 
still an overall sentence of 37 months. However, 
Justice Moldaver, speaking  for the Court of Appeal, 
would have nothing  to do with it. “Courts ought not 
to be imposing  inadequate or artificial sentences at 
all, let alone for the purpose of circumventing 
Parliament’s will on matters of immigration,” he said. 
“The 30-month penitentiary sentence imposed on 
the [accused] for the offence of criminal negligence 
causing  death while street racing  was not unfit; 
indeed, if anything, I think it was lenient.” The 
accused’s sentence appeal was dismissed. Ontario 
Court of Appeal: R. v. Badhwar, 2011 ONCA 266.
“Courts ought not to be imposing 
inadequate or artificial sentences at 
all, let alone for the purpose of 
circumventing Parliament’s will on 
matters of immigration.”
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FLAG MAN IN STREET RACE TO 
FACE NEW TRIAL
A trial judge failed to properly 
consider or apply the Criminal Code 
provisions under s. 21 when he 
acquitted an accused for acting  as 
the “flag  man” and signaling  the start 
of a three car street race which resulted in one of the 
drivers losing  control, colliding  with a lamp post, 
and dying  as a result. The accused, a 16-year-old 
youth, and the two surviving  drivers were charged 
with criminal negligence causing  death while street 
racing. The Ontario Court of Justice granted a 
directed verdict of acquittal after finding  that 
dropping  a jacket to start the race was not sufficient 
to constitute the offence of criminal negligence 
causing  death. The Crown appealed to the Ontario 
Court of Appeal. Establishing  the actus reus for 
aiding  an offence of criminal negligence causing 
death under s. 21(1)(b) requires the Crown to show 
that an accused did something  (or in some cases 
omitted to do something) that assisted another in 
committing  the offence. As for the mens rea of 
aiding  criminal negligence it involves two elements; 
the criminally negligent act (or omission) and the 
consequence that the act or omission caused bodily 
harm or death. As for the first mens rea element, “it 
is necessary that an aider do something  with intent 
to assist conduct that is criminally negligent and 
know sufficient details of the assisted conduct to 
render that conduct criminally negligent.  Thus, the 
conduct that the aider knows he or she is assisting 
must constitute a marked and substantial departure 
from what is reasonable in the circumstances. ... [I]t 
is not necessary that the aider know the law, nor that 
he or she appreciate the legal consequences of the 
conduct being  assisted.  Rather, the aider will have 
aided the commission of the offence if he or she 
intentionally assists conduct which constitutes the 
offence and knows the principal intends to commit 
it.  In those circumstances, it may be said that an 
aider did something  “for the purpose of” assisting 
the commission of the offence.” As for the second 
mens rea element (the consequences), the mental 
element is objective foresight of bodily harm. “It is 
not necessary that an aider have subjective foresight 
of the consequence of the criminally negligent act 
he or she is assisting. Rather, it is sufficient to show 
that a reasonable person, in all the circumstances, 
would have appreciated a consequence – bodily 
harm that is not trivial or transient – would result.” In 
this case, dropping  the jacket was an act that 
assisted the car drivers to participate in a street race. 
Street racers threaten the lives and safety of others in 
the area. As for mens rea, there was evidence that 
the accused intended to assist the street race and 
knew the details of how it would take place. It was 
open to a court to conclude that the street race was 
a marked and substantial departure from what was 
reasonable in the circumstances and it could have 
been foreseeable that bodily harm could result. The 
Crown’s appeal was allowed, the accused’s acquittal 
was set aside, and a new trial was ordered. Ontario 
Court of Appeal: R. v. M.R., 2011 ONCA 190.
MORE ON CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE
There are several sections in the Criminal Code that 
deal with criminal negligence. In s. 219(1) criminal 
negligence is defined as doing  anything  or omitting 
to do anything  that someone has a duty to do and 
showing  wanton or reckless disregard for the lives or 
safety of other persons. However, there is no offence 
of criminal negligence simpliciter. A person will only 
be liable for criminal negligence if death or bodily 
harm results. 
CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE OFFENCES
section description punishment
220 criminal negligence cause death max. life
4 yrs. min. if 
firearm used
221 criminal negligence cause bodily harm max. 10 yrs.
249.2 criminal negligence cause death
(street racing)
max. life
249.3 criminal negligence cause bodily harm
(street racing)
max. 14 yrs. 
662(5) dangerous driving as included offence 
662(5) flight cause bodily harm or death as included offence
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CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE OFFENCE GRID
based on R. v. M.R., 2011 ONCA 190
Principal Offender Aider
PHYSICAL ELEMENT
Actus Reus
• The conduct or ommission 
represents a marked and 
substantial departure from the 
conduct of a reasonably 
prudent person in the 
circumstances.
• The accused did something 
(or in some cases omitted to 
do something) that assisted 
another in committing the 
offence.
MENTAL ELEMENT
Mens Rea #1
(the criminally negligent act or omission)
• A modified objective test
• Must consider the facts existing 
at the time in light of the 
accusedʼs perception of those 
facts and assess whether the 
accusedʼs conduct, in view of 
his or her perception of the 
facts, constituted a marked and 
substantial departure from what 
would be reasonable in the 
circumstances. 
• A court should consider 
whether the accused either 
adverted to the risk involved 
and disregarded it, or failed to 
direct his or her mind to the risk 
and the need to take care at all.  
• In most cases, the mental 
element can be inferred from 
the accusedʼs conduct or 
omission.
• An aider must do something 
with intent to assist conduct 
that is criminally negligent and 
know sufficient details of the 
assisted conduct to render 
that conduct criminally 
negligent.  
• The conduct that the aider 
knows he or she is assisting 
must constitute a marked and 
substantial departure from 
what is reasonable in the 
circumstances.  
• It is NOT necessary that the 
aider know the law, nor that he 
or she appreciated the legal 
consequences of the conduct 
being assisted. Rather, the 
aider will have aided the 
commission of the offence if 
he or she intentionally assists 
conduct which constitutes the 
offence and knows the 
principal intends to commit it.  
Mens Rea #2
(the consequences of the act or omission: 
bodily harm or death)
• Objective foreseeability that 
bodily harm would ensue.
• It is NOT necessary that the 
principal subjectively foresaw 
death as a consequence of his 
or her acts.
• Objective foresight of bodily 
harm. It is sufficient to show 
that a reasonable person, in 
all the circumstances, would 
have appreciated a 
consequence – bodily harm 
that is not trivial or transient – 
would result. 
• It is NOT necessary that an 
aider have subjective foresight 
of the consequence of the 
criminally negligent act he or 
she is assisting.  
Volume 11 Issue 2 - March/April 2011
PAGE 36
CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT 
MURDER IS A YCJA ‘VIOLENT 
OFFENCE’
Fol lowing  h i s conv ic t ion fo r 
conspiracy to commit murder the 
accused, a youth, was sentenced to 
12 months custody and 6 months 
conditional supervision. He supplied 
the Tylenol 3 used to drug  the deceased so that it 
would be easier to drown her, offered to assist with 
an alibi, and encouraged another to commit the 
murder. He then appealed his sentence, submitting 
that conspiracy to commit murder was not a violent 
offence under s. 39(1)(a) of the Youth Criminal Justice 
Act and therefore the judge imposed an illegal 
custodial sentence.  The Ontario Court of Appeal 
disagreed with the accused and concluded that 
conspiracy to commit murder was a violent offence. 
The meaning  of “violent offence” in s. 39(1) is harm-
based (which focuses on its effects), rather than 
force-based (which focuses on the means employed 
to produce the effects). The harm-based rationale 
captures offences deserving  of a custodial sentence 
which might not be captured by the force-based 
approach. A violent offence under is an offence in 
the commission of which a young  person causes, 
attempts to cause or threatens to cause bodily harm.  
“Conspiracy to commit murder, like attempted 
murder, falls within what would ordinarily be 
considered a violent offence,” said Justice 
Rosenberg, writing  the Court of Appeal’s decision. “I 
recognize that not all cases of conspiracy to commit 
murder may necessarily fall within the harm-based 
approach...; but in my view the facts of this case fall 
within the definition in that the [accused] caused or 
at the very least attempted to cause bodily harm to 
the deceased by supplying  the Tylenol 3 and 
encouraging  [his friend] to commit the murder.” 
However, on other grounds, the accused’s sentence 
was reduced to 8 months in custody and 4 months 
conditional supervision. Ontario Court of Appeal: R. 
v. J.F., 2011 ONCA 220.
Side Bar
“Liability as a Party to Conspiracy”
The Ontario Court of Appeal also ruled that the being 
a party to conspiracy under s. 21 of the Criminal Code 
was an offence. In order for a person to be liable as a 
s. 21(1) party to conspiracy the Crown must prove an 
agreement by at least two other people to commit a 
substantive offence. If the accused is a party to the 
conspiracy by encouraging someone to join the 
conspiracy or aiding or abetting the furtherance of its 
object, the risk of the commission of the criminal 
offence has sufficiently materialized to warrant 
criminal sanction. If no agreement materializes, the 
alleged party’s conduct would at most be an attempt 
to conspire, which is not a crime. 
Reach
The reach of party liability to conspiracy includes 
abetting as well as aiding or abetting a person to 
become a member of the conspiracy: 
Aiding a conspiracy within the meaning of s. 21(b) 
is no less harmful than abetting. Liability for aiding a 
conspiracy would require proof that the accused did 
or omitted to do something for the specific purpose 
of aiding another to commit the offence of 
conspiracy. That degree of mens rea imports a 
sufficient level of fault to warrant criminal 
liability. [I]t would not be enough that the accused’s 
acts had the effect of aiding the conspiracy, the 
accused must also have the requisite mens rea. 
[para. 23]
Furthermore, liability as a party to conspiracy is not 
limited to acts for the purpose of aiding or abetting 
the actual formation of the agreement or aiding or 
abetting someone to join the conspiracy. Party liability 
includes aiding or abetting pursuit of the unlawful 
object. 
R. v. J.F., 2011 ONCA 220
“Conspiracy to commit murder, like 
attempted murder, falls within what 
would ordinarily be considered a 
violent offence.”
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PRE-COURT PHYSICAL LINE-UP 
‘POLLUTED’
The British Columbia Court of Appeal 
h a s d e s c r i b e d t h e p r e - c o u r t 
identification of an accused used 
during  the investigation of several 
sexual offences as “fraught with 
problems”. After refusing  to participate in a physical 
line-up the accused was forced into one. A number 
tag  was put over his head and a police officer held 
him in a headlock. Five police officers and two other 
prisoners acted as foils in the line-up, which lasted 
about three minutes. The accused moved his head 
about and was very uncooperative. Eleven 
complainants viewed him in the police lineup. A 
photograph of the procedure was taken by police 
(see below). Identification by the complainants 
ranged from tentative to non-existent. He was 
released from custody the following  day and another 
woman was later sexually assaulted. An array of 
photographs was shown to her. There were head and 
shoulder photographs of six other men included in 
the array. The accused’s photograph, taken from the 
waist up, showed him standing  in front of a jail cell 
with the arm of a uniformed police officer in the 
foreground, unlike any of the foils. The backgrounds 
of the foils were either blank or otherwise neutral. In 
addition, each of the six foils were, by appearance, 
at least ten years younger than the accused. He was 
the only one with a full moustache or curly hair. The 
foils all had hair length at least to the collar and over 
the ears, while the accused’s hair was cut back and 
higher on the forehead.  The witness made a 
conditional identification and the accused was again 
arrested. Later, the accused was identified in court. 
He was convicted on five counts of indecent assault, 
two counts of attempted rape, and three counts of 
rape. He was declared a dangerous offender and 
sentenced to an indefinite period of incarceration. 
Justice Low, in quashing  the accused’s convictions, 
found the photographic line-up fatally unfair. The 
photograph of the accused stood out unfairly and 
would have focussed the witness on him. 
Furthermore, the physical line-up should not have 
been conducted at all because it became a “farce”. 
“There is no telling  what influence the prominent 
display of the [accused] by the police officers during 
that event ultimately had on the six complainants 
when they were asked in court if they could identify 
the assailant,” said Justice Low. “Police investigators 
should have prepared a proper and fair photographic 
line-up instead of forcing  the [accused] to participate 
in the physical line-up. ... [T]he pre-trial 
identification procedures were  seriously flawed and 
unfair. ... The process of identification was polluted 
so as to render in-court identification of the 
[accused] on each count highly questionable and 
unreliable on the reasonable doubt standard.” After 
serving  nearly 27 years in prison the accused was 
acquitted and released. British Columbia Court of 
Appeal: R. v. Henry, 2010 BCCA 462. 
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Online Social Networking for Criminal Investigations and Intelligence
May 30, 2011
This one day (8 hour) course is designed for criminal intelligence analysts, special agents, and 
other investigators that encounter drug trafficking, diversion, and related crimes.  Investigators 
with any level of familiarity with the Internet and computers, from beginning to advanced, will 
find this course beneficial.
The program gives investigators an up-to-date understanding of how social networking sites 
work and how members act and interact.  Investigators will learn what information is available 
on various sites and how to integrate that information into criminal investigations and criminal 
intelligence analysis. Too often, investigators and analysts overlook or underutilize this 
valuable resource.  Social networking sites are virtual communities.  As in any large 
community, criminal organizations, fraud, violet crime, and victimization exist.  Investigators 
need to understand these communities along with the tools, tricks, and techniques to prevent, 
track, and solve crimes.
Date: Monday, May 30, 2011
Time: 0800-1630 hrs
Where: JIBC New Westminster
Presenter: Charles Cohen
Cost: $100 plus HST (includes networking lunch)
Register: Registration can be made directly through the JIBC – Registration 
Department at: (604) 528-5590.  Please quote registration number 
POLADV711 Online Social Networking for Criminal Investigations/
Intelligence.
Students receive course material, including legal process contact information, preservation 
letters, boilerplate compliance documents, and resource guides.
NOTICE: Course contains graphic content including profanity, and sexual and violent 
images.
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JIBC ALUMNI COMING SOON!
Many of you will have fond – or at least vivid - memories of your formative training experiences 
prior to becoming a police officer. For many of you those recollections are unforgettable, but 
distant. We came to policing with diverse backgrounds, training and experience, but we bonded 
through common experiences and challenges. Many of us have developed life-long  friendships 
and connections. In some cases as a result of assignment duties, family commitments and the 
like, we have drifted apart. We sincerely look forward to your support in helping us to establish 
an organization of a Justice Institute of British Columbia Police Alumni, not only to help people 
to stay connected, but also to reconnect.  
Through an alumni organization we can keep everyone informed about new developments in 
policing, educational programs, and upcoming events.  This will be an amazing opportunity to 
build and rekindle relationships and expand knowledge through networking. Despite the name, 
this is not limited to alumni of JIBC. There are many members who received training at the BC 
Police College and other predecessor organizations to the JIBC and we are encouraging them all 
to become members.
The objects of the JIBC Police Alumni are being defined but will include keeping members 
informed about what is happening at the JIBC, such as new developments in policing  and 
educational programs, including the new graduate certificates in Criminal Investigation and 
Intelligence. 
We also hope the JIBC Police Alumni will be able to access and develop the legions of 
outstanding untapped policing leaders and mentors who represent policing at its best.  In this 
regard, we hope to encourage many opportunities for our alumni, such as encouraging and 
mentoring new police recruits, promoting educational excellence, and reaching  out to our 
communities to support policing education and to show policing in a positive light.
A further object will be to support education and training. We hope to encourage a variety of 
opportunities for lifelong learning, such as a new motorcycle course and a Bachelor’s degree 
program, to name a few.  We believe that by working together in diverse ways we can foster a 
spirit of loyalty and pride in our association and make a positive difference in the world.  
Please contact - if you are interested.
                           Linda Stewart                  John Pennant                 Mike Trump
                            lstewart@jibc.ca                  jpennant@jibc.ca                mtrump@jibc.ca
Stay posted for further information in upcoming newsletters.
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JIBC announces two new Graduate 
Certificates in Tactical Criminal Analysis and 
Intelligence Analysis
As law enforcement agencies struggle with limited resources, 
the need for improved crime and intelligence analysis has 
increased.  These new online graduate programs prepare both 
current and aspiring law enforcement professionals to design 
and apply strategies to solve modern problems that challenge 
crime and intelligence analysts daily.
The curriculum focuses on developing the skills required to 
collect and analyze crime data to forecast criminal profiles; 
documenting suspicious relationships between people, 
organizations and events; and using statistical techniques to 
solve crime.  Significant emphasis is also placed on the need to 
effectively and clearly communicate findings and prepare 
recommendations for decision-makers.
You will enjoy state-of-the-art learning resources; networking 
opportunities with employers in both the public and private 
sectors; and exposure to faculty with significant experience in 
the field.
Courses Include: 
• Intelligence Theories and Applications
• Intelligence Communications
• Advanced Analytical Techniques
• Tactical Criminal Intelligence
• Competitive Intelligence
• Analytical Methodologies for Tactical Criminal 
Intelligence
• Analyzing Financial Crimes
The Justice Institute of British Columbia (JIBC) is Canada’s leading public safety educator - a dynamic not-for-profit public 
post-secondary institution recognized nationally and internationally for innovative education in the areas of justice and 
public safety. The JIBC offers a range of applied and academic programs (certificates, diplomas, and degrees) that span the 
spectrum of safety - from prevention to response and recovery.
Specific entrance requirements 
are needed for admission to 
either certificate
Contact Us
Email
jpsd@jibc.ca
Phone
604.528.5590 or
toll-free 1.877.528.5591
Fax
604.528.5754
Mail
Justice & Public Safety 
Division
Justice Institute of British 
Columbia
715 McBride Boulevard
New Westminster, BC
V3L 5T4 Canada
